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Many economists, notably Nurske, have advocated that trade as an
engine for growth in numerous economic literature. Based on this common
belief, many less developed countries have embarked on a trade expansion
program since the early 1960's. It is, however, rather unfortunate that
their fortunes vary. Some economies have remained virtually stagnant,
while others achieved spectacular growth. Hong Kong and South Korea are
two of the fortunate ones~ their phenomenal economic growth have often
2
been quoted as examples of economic miracles. The choice of South
Korea for comparison in this study is based on the general belief that
South Korea is one of the major competitorof Hong Kong. However, before
analysing the patterns of trade of these two countries, a brief discussion
of their economic backgrounds will be helpful.
1.1 Hong Kong: Economic Background since Worlcl_ War II
Due to her special geographical location, and her traditional relation
with China, Hong Kong was once a successful entrepot in the Far East before
World War II. The earnings from the entrepot trade gradually grinded to a
stop after 1949 when the present Chinese Government .came into power and
nationalised the export and import trade with the world. Also, the Korean
War broke out in 1951 and an embargo was imposed by the U.S.A.. on the imports
of all Chinese products and by the United Nations on the exports of essential
materials and strategic goods to China. That was the end of the Hong Kong
entrepot trade.
1. R. Nurske, Patterns of Trade and Development (Stockholm: Wiksell Lecture,
Almgvist Wiksell, 1959).
2. K.R. Chou, The Hong Kong Economy: A Miracle of Growth (Hong Kong, 1966)
In order to survive, Hong Kong began to industrialise. A period of
transformation started in about the mid fifties and was successfully com¬
pleted after a decade and Hong Kong began to take off. From 1S65 to
1974, the GDP of Hong Kong rose from US$1,840 million to US$6,660 million,
an increase of 362%. Such a miraculous growth was made possible by
the success of the export-oriented industries which have shouldered the
responsibility since the mid fifties. During the period of 1965- 74,
export has increased by nearly five times. The following table shows the
GDP and value of exports of Hong Kong during the 1965- 74 period.
Table 1.1
GDP (at current prices) and value of exports of Hong Kong
1965-1974
( US$ Million)
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
GDP (Y)
Total Export(X)
X/ Y in %
1840 1940 2150 2180 2560 3050 3480 4280 5880 6660
1143 1324 1524 1744 2178 2514 2871 3478 5051 5907
62.1 68.2 70.9 80.0 85.1 82.4 82.5 81.2 85.9 88.7
Sources: For Export data Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
U.N.,1965-74.
GDP data Yearbook of National Account Statistics, U.N.,
1965-74.
3. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, U.N, 1965-74.
The XY ratio in Table 1.1. is an unmistakable evidence of how
trade-dependent the Hong Kong economy is. Since 1968, the total ex-
port value amounted to over 80% of the GDP, reaching 88.7% in 1974.
If the trend continues, it is quite likely that the ratio will further
increase.
1.2. South Korea: Economic Background since World War II
After World War II and during the Korean War, private foreign trade,
was virtually non-existent apart from a small amount of private barter.
The Government was the major exporter of a limited range of primary pro¬
ducts, and imports were strictly controlled. Nearly all imports were
financed by grant assistance or war redemptions by the United Nations
Command during the War, and the Government itself was the major importer
both before and during the War. A multiplicity of exchange rates applied
to a variety of transactions. By the end of the Korea War, the official
exchange rate represented a serious over-valuation of the won despite
six major devaluations since 1945.
The first six or seven years after the Korean War brought sporadic
growth of GDP, widely fluctuating exports, rapidly growing 'imports, and
an increasing trade deficit financed by U.N. and U.S. Grant Assistance.
By 1960, foreign trade and economic institutions had progressed from
complete disarray of the early 3.950' s. However, the bureaucratic mech-
ansims that governed trade and payments were complex and cumbersome.
After the general election in early 1964, the nominally elected
civilian government devalued the won by almost 50 percent from 130 to
257 won to the dollar. A series of reforms were also instituted in 1964
and 196o:that weie to be accompanied by a phenomenal economic performance.
From 1965 to 1974, the GDP of Korea Republic rose from US$2,940 million
4
to US$14,140 million, an increase of 480 percent. Like Hong Kong, it
was probably the export earnings that made such a miraculous growth pos¬
sible. From 1965 to 1974, export has increased from US$175.08 million
5
to US$4,460.37 million. The following table shows the GDP and the value
of exports of South Korea from 1965 to 1974.
Table 1.2
GDP (at current prices) and value of exports of Korea Republic
1965-1974
(US$ Million)




2940 3770 4550 5600 6760 8160 8460 9710 13480 14140
175 250 320 455 623 835 1068 1624 3225 4460
5.9 6.6 7.0 8.1 9.2 10.2 12.6 16.7 25.8 31.5
Sources: For Export da.ta Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U_._N.,
1965-1974.
GDP data: Yearbook of National Account Statistics, U.N.,
1965-1974.
4. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, U.N., 1965-1974.
5. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-1974,
It is obvious that, before 1970, the ratio of exportGDP was rather
low at less than 10%. Although a country of Korea Republic's population
and income might have been expected to reach a much higher level of exports,
perhaps of at least 10 or 15 percent of GDP. Thus one explanation of South
Korea's export performance in the 1960s is to say that what appears to be
growth is really a case of catching up to some normal level. By 1972,
however, South Korea exports had surpassed that level that is usual in
6
countries of similar population and income. Exports reached about 32
percent of GDP in 1974 and the tendency towards rapid expansion continues.
While early growth of exports might be attributed in part simply to catching-
up, continued growth remains to be explained.
1.3 The Industrial Structures
The economies of Hong Kong and South Korea are quite similar in the
sense that they have similar industrial structures. Examples of their
similarities are (1) their degree of commodity concentration, (2) their
geographical concentration, and (3) their wage structures.
1.3.1 Commodity concentration
As mentioned before, both Hong Kong and South Korea are (at least in
the 1970s) dependent economies. Not only do they depend on trade, they,
to a very large extent, depend on trade of only a few exportable commod¬
ities. The degree of commodity concentration is usually measured by the
6. See Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and Cheh, John, The Share of Manufacturing
Exports in Total Exports of LDC's: A Cross Section Analysis, in
International Economics and Development: Essay in Honor of Raul
Prebisch. Eugenio DiMarco, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
7
Gini coefficient of concentration. If there are n export goods, the
annual value of exports of any good i is x, and the annual value of
total exports is X, the coefficient of concentration of exports will be:
and likewise for imports. For convenience, this is multiplied by 100.
Obviously, the highest possible coefficient is 100, where all exports
consist of a single good. The lowest possible coefficient is 100JiT.
Thus, the Gini coeffient, in a nutshell, indicates the degree to which
the economic fortune of a country is dependent upon one or a few goods.
Michaely has warned that the value of the Gini coefficient depends,
of all things, on the level of aggregation. The larger the number of
goods exported by a country, the smaller the index. This has been shown
9
to be true for the Hong Kong case. However, since we are only interested
7. This method was first used by Albert 0,Hirschman, National Power
and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1945), Chapter VI. Hirschman only
measured the geographic concentration of trade, not the cortimodity
concentration. It has also been used by M. Michaely, Concentration
of Exports and Imports: An International Comparison, Economic Journal,
LXVIII, December, 1958, pp.723 et sqq). For a theoretical discussion
and bibliography, see Y.P.Ho, Export Instabilities and Employment
Fluctuations in a Trade-Dependent Economy: Hong Kong as a Case Study,
(unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1977),
Chapter III.
8. See Michaely,op. cit., p.723.
9. See Y.P. Ho, op. cit., Table 3.1 and 3.2.
in a comparison of the Gini index of Hong Kong and South Korea, and not
the magniture of the index per se, a one-digit SITC is adopted for .sim¬
plicity. The following table shows the Gini coefficients of Exports and
Imports of Hong Kong and South Korea.
Tab1e 1.3
Gini Coefficients of Commodity Concentration of
Hong Kong and South Korea Exports and Imports Based
























































































Source: Derived from Stratistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, U.N.,
1975.
The figures in Table 1.3 conform to our expectation. Both countries
seem to have a very high degree of export concentration, especially Hong
Kong. This is not surprising if we look at the actual export figures,
we will find that the largest export item (SITC-section 8) accounts for
about 50% of total exports, while the same item accounts for only about
35% of total South Korea exports. As for imports, the Gini coefficients
of the two countries are nearly identical at around 40%.
1.3.2 Geographic Concentration
The Gini Coeffficient of geographic concentration of exports of a
particular country refers to the geographic distribution of market outlets
of her exports. A country which exports most of her exports to one or
just a few countries would have a high Gini coefficient. However, in
this section, instead of finding the Gini coefficients of geographic
concentration of exports of Kong Kong and South Korea to all countries,
we try some thing slightly different. We calculated the degree of con¬
centration of Hong Kong and South Koreas exports to U.S.A., U.K., F.R.
Germany and Japan only. As will be shown in Chapter 2, these four coun¬
tries accounted for over 50 percent of the exports of the tv?o countries
during the 1965-1974 period. The variations of the Gini-coefficient
over time will indicate whether the two countries are diversifying their
exports outlets or not.
10. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Bacific, U.N., 1975.
Table 1.4
Gini Coefficients of Geographic Concentration of Hong Kong



































Source Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N.
1965-1974.
The Gini-Coefficients of geographic concentration of Hong Kong and
South Korea exports are presented in Table 1.4. From the figures ve observe
that the geographic distribution of exports are highly concentrated, especially
South Korea It is interesting to note that both countries's exports became
more concentrated geographically in the period 1968-1971, and less con¬
centrated at both ends -of the period. There is a tendency for both coun¬
tries to diversify their geographic outlets since the early 1970's.
1.3.3 Wage Structures
It is understood that one of the most important factors that
affects production and exports is the cost of labor. The relation¬
ship is an obvious one. Given the productivity of labour, low wages
keep production costs down and heighten the competitiveness of the
product. Higher wages lead to higher production costs and more expen¬
sive product. If sales then shaken, production activities decrease
and national income falls off.
It is believed that one of the reasons that lies behind the
success of Hong Kong and South Korea exports is the abundant supply of
labor at very low wages. Although it is true that, in 1974, the average
hourly earnings in the manufacturing industry of Hong Kong is 1.5 times
11
that jof South Korea, the wage structure of the two countries are
very similar. The following table shows the rank of the wages of Hong
Kong and South Korean industries.
The Spearman's rank-correlation coefficient of the wage structure
of the two countries is 0.68 and is significant at.1% level. The wage
structure of the two countries is thus very similar.
11. T.Y. Cheng, The Economy of Hong Kong, (Hong Kong, 1977), Table 14.4.
Tab1e 1.5














































































































Source: Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, Vol.1, General Industrial Statistics
1975, Edition, U.N.
Since Hong Kong has no Petroleum and petroleum products industries, the Sou.:'.
Korean counterparts are thus also leftout.
1.4 Purpose and Scope of the Study
One of the problems facing the Hong Kong Government since
the early 1970's has been the levelling off of export growth and the
challenge exerted by other Far East Countries, notably South Korea.
The export performance of Hong Kong and South Korea in the 1965-74
period is presented in Chapter 2. However, since there are some indus¬
tries of which Hong Kong has virtually no exports, and in order to
make the comparison more meaningful, we decided to concentrate on only
12 basic industries. Further, instead of analysing their export per¬
formance in the world market, we will concentrate on four markets only,
namely, U.S.A., U.K.,Germany F.R. and Japan.
Chapter 3 is a continuation of Chapter 2. In this chapter, Hong
Kong and South Korea export performance in the four market as a Group,
and in each of the market separately, is analysed. A sector-by-sector
analysis is also given for the U.S.market. Further, Hong Kong share
decline in the Group Market as well as in the U.S. market and South
Korea responsibility is quantified.
In Chapter 4, the structure of Hong Kong and South Korea exports
of the 12 basic industries to the Group Market and to each of the four
markets will be discussed, including certa.in aspects of changes in
structure over the 1965-74 period. The analytical tools used will be
two simple concepts: sector intensity and area intensity of fra.de.
The main objective of this chapter is to compare the balance of trade
of Hong Kong and South Korea and to analyse the changes of the better-
than-average sector (B'TA) over time.
Chapter 5 analyses the patterns of trade of Hong Kong and South
Korea by the Constant-Market-Share approach.. The first section lays
out the theoretical groundwork of the theory, coupled with criticisms
raised by others. The second section applies the theory to Hong Kong
and South Korea exports to the Group Market. Sectoral performance in
the Group Market for three different periods for the two Countries
are also discussed. The last section analyses the changes in market
share by-sector-by-area.
All the previous chapter did not pay sufficient attention to
the supply side as the determining factor of trade patterns. Chapter 6
follows the Ricardian approach to the determination of the pattern of
trade of the two Countries to the Group Market. It is assumed that
relative export value is a function of relative productivity, relative
wage and relative unit labor cost. .In order to confirm whether the
trade pattern with the Group Market is representative, all the vari¬
ables are also tested for each of the four markets under consideration.
The last section of this chapter attempts to examine the revealed
comparative advantage of Hong Kong and South Korea as compared to
the Group Countries.
ChaiJter 7 analyses the trade flows of Hong Kong and South Korea
to the Group Market. By using the Gravity Model we try to ascertain
whether the demand or the supply factor is the major determinant of
trade flows.
The concluding chapter of this study summarises the main points
and empirical results of the previous chapters. It also outlines
briefly the possible reasons for South Korea's success and Hong Kong's
failures in export performance.
CHAPTER II: EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF HONG KONG AND SOUTH KOREA
In this chapter, competition between Hong Kong and South Korea
in the third-country market is examined for the period 1965-1974 by
analysis of the changing market shares of the two countries. Market
shares are calculated for each of the 21 sectors and subsectors of
manufacturing in each of the 4 countries of the world. However, for
most part, the discussion is limited to the following 12 sectors':
Food (0), Textiles (65), Non-metal (66), Metal manufactures (69),
Machinery (71), Electric (72), Transport (73), Furniture (82),
Clothings (84), Footwear (85), Professional (86) and Miscellaneous
2
(89). Sectors not included are Beverages (11), Tobacco (12), Chem¬
icals (5), Leather (61), Rubber (62), Wood (63), Paper (64), Iron
2
(67) and Non-ferrous (68) because they are relatively unimportant as
far as Hong Kong exports are concerned. As Table 2.1 below indicates,
the 12 sectors under examination here provided 88% and 71% of the ex¬
ports of Hong Kong and South Korea to the world in 1974 respectively.
1. Industry and sector will be used interchangeably throughout this
study.
2. Figures in parenthesis are SITC codes.
Table 2.1
Composition of Exports of Manufactures, 1974






































Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N.,1974.
The areas of the world considered are U.S.A., U.K., Germany F.R.,
and Japan. These four markets (hereafter referred to as the Group)
were chosen because of their importance to Hong Kong and South Korea-
they accounted for more than 50% of the total exports of Hong Kong and
South Korea in the 1965-74 period. However, since U.S.A. is by far the
largest market for both countries, major emphasis will be placed on
this country. The following table shows the values of exports to the
Group as a percentage of their total exports.
Table 2.2
Hong Kong and South Korea Exports to the
Group as a percentage of Total Exports
Value in US$'000
1974 1973 1972 1971 1970
HK Total Exports
HK Exports to the Group
in%
SK Total Exports
SK Exports to the Group
in%
5906788 5051389 3477501 2871131 2514282
3046989 2848966 2091509 1724661 1498384
51.6 56.4 60.1 60.1 59.6
4460371 3225025 1624087 1067587 835185
3222437 2459266 1246944 839344 665243
72.2 76.3 76.8 78.7 79.7
(to be continued)
Table 2.2 (continued)
1969 1968 1967 1966 1965
HK Total Exports
HK Exports to the Group
in%
SK Total Exports
SK Exports to the Group
in%
2177531 1390688 1163118 1323544 1142673
1290040 917621 730908 705648 611109
59.2 66.0 62.8 53.3 53.5
622515 455399 320229 250334 175082
472475 351853 235341 174116 112452
75.9 77.3 73.5 69.6 64.2
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
As Table 2.2 above shows, the.Group market is more important to
South Korea than Hong Kong- it accounted for over 70% of South Korea
exports in 1974 while only half of Hong Kong exports went to the Group.
The high percentage for South Korea conforms with the high Gini-coe-
fficient of geographic concentration of South Korea in Table 1.4.
2•1 Hong Kong and South Korea Aggregated Export Trends
Before examining the Hong Kong and South Korea export per¬
formance in each of the markets, the share of world exports, captured
by these two countries are given in Table 2.3 and Chart 2.1 below.
Table 2.3
Hong Kong and South Korea Share in World Exports
(value in million US dollars)





























































Source: Statistical Yearbook, U. N., 1974.
Chart 2.1 shows that from 1965 to 1973 both Hong Kong and
South Korea had an increase in share of world exports throughout.
Comparing the two trends, South Korea is of course more promising.
Although she started from a very low position, her rate of in¬
crease was much faster and was closing the gap at the turn of the
70's. 1974 was a rather bad year for both countries, especially
Hong Kong. Her share fell from 0.88% to 0,70%, a decline of 20% in
one year. The rate of decline for South Korea was only 5%. However,
both countries had an increase in export values.
Chart 2.1
Kong Kong and South Korea Export Shares in World
Exports
Source: Derived from Table 203®
The export performance of these two countries in the Group
was very similar to their performance in the world market. As Table
2.4 and Chart 2.2 reveal that Hong Kong had a slight increase in
share from 1965 to 1967, then a sharp rise in share in the years
1968-1969. Her share was 1.08% in 1968, but 1.38%in 1969, a rise of
28% in just one year. Her share continued to climb until 1972 when
she had a slight fall in that year. In 1974, she had a 25% fall in
share from 1.42% to 1.06%. This coincided nicely with her perform¬
ance in the world when she had a 20% decline in share in 1974, The
disappointing performance in the Group market from 1972 onwards is
most likely responsible for the fall in the share of world export:
market captured by Hong Kong.
Similar to her performance in the world, South Korea started
in 1965 with a lower share than Hong Kong in the Group. With a
higher rate of growth, her share rose from 0.18% in 1965 to 1.22%
in 1973, a rise of 588% in nine years. Her share fell slightly in
1974. However, it was also in 1974 that South Korea overtook Hong
Kong in share captured in the Group market.
Table 2.4









































































Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Chart 2C2
Hong Kong and South Korea Shares in Grour Imports
Source% Derived from Table
2.2 Export performance of the Basic Industry in the Group Market
Our main interest, however, lies in the performance of the
12 basic industries (hereafter Basic Industry) in the Group market.
As it turns out, the picture is different. Table 2.5 and Chart 2.3
below show the aggregated export performance of the Basic Industry
of the two countries in the Group Market.
Chart 23
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Shares
of Group Imports
Source: Derived from Table 25
LJL
Iiong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry
Share of Group Iiaport
Value in US$ million
1974 1973 1972 1971 1970
Group Import (Y)
Hong Kong Export (X)
XY in%
South Korea Export (Z)
Z/Y in %
120741 104722 79657 65048 56146
2569 2339 1773 1318 1288
2.13 2.23 2.23 2.02 2.29
2278 1764 834 557 453
1.89 1.68 1.05 0.89 0.81
Value in US$ million
1969 1968 1967 1966 1965
Group Import (Y)
Hong Kong Export (X)
XY in%
South Korea Export (Z)
Z/Y in%
47476 40844 34469 32798 28657
1110 877 696 602 512
2.34 2.15 2.02 1.83 1.79
311 230 144 100 63
0.66 0.56 0.42 0.30 0.22
Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Chart 2.3 shows that the share of Hong Kong Basic Industry in
the Group market had an initial success from the mid-60s onwards
up to 1969. Then her share began to decline. Although her share had
a revival in 1972, but it was only for one year. South Korea started
from a much lower position, but she had an increase in share through¬
out the 10 years period. The increase was quite smooth, except for
1973.
Comparing the share captured by Hong Kong in the Group market
in 1965 and 1974, Hong Kong share has increased by 19%. Assuming
linear share gain over the period 1965-1974, we would expect 55% of
the gain to be obtained from 1969 onwards. However, the trend of
Hong Kong share in the Group, as shown in Chart 2.3, is not one of a
continuous rising curve. Thus, instead of being responsible for 55%
of the share rise, the 1969-1974 period registered share loss of
-47.2%
A quick examination of Chart Al to Chart A12 in the Appendix
shows that decline in share from the late 60 s onwards has been the
general pattern in 9 of the 12 sectors of Hong Kcng, though the year
of decline varied between 1967 and 1971. The exceptions are Electric,
Professional and Machinery. As for Electric, her share fell in 1969,
but rose back to peak in 1972, then it fell again; as for Profes¬
sional, her share fell also in 1969 for two years, then shot up to
its highest ever position'in 1974. The only industry of which Hong
Kong had an almost increasing share throughout was Machinery. Except
for a slight decline in 1971, the share rose throughout.
The export performance of the 12 Basic Industries of South
Korea in the Group market behaved exactly like the aggregated per-
formance, i.e., a smooth rising trend. The only difference is that
her share continued to climb in 1974, instead of falling like that in
Chart 2.2. The percent share gain in 1969-1974 period out of total
gain of the whole period was 23.3%.
Four points should be noted here. First, of the 12 basic sectors,
10 of them started with a smaller share than her Hong Kong counter-
parts in the Group market. The two exceptions were Food and Machinery.
Second, and with no exception, The shares of these 12 basic industries
shot up either in 1971 or 1972. Third, 5 of the industries overtook
Hong Kong in shares, mainly during the 1971-73 period. They were
Textiles, Non-metal, Metal Manufactures, Transport and Footwear. In
addition with Food and Machinery of which South Korea already had a
higher share, South Korea thus had a lead in 7 out of the 12 basic
industries in 1974. Fourth, and perhaps most important is the fact
that, in Electric, Clothings, and Miscellaneous, the three largest
Hong Kong industries, the gap between the two countries are closing
fast. The performance of these 10 industries adequately explains
why the gap between these countries are closing to only a 0.24% in
1974. The most promising industry for Hong Kong is undoubtedly Pro-
fessional- she still has a sizable lead and her share is still
rising. By 1974, the 12 Hong Kong Basic industries had 2.13% of the
share in the Group market, and South Korea controlled 1.89%. The
following two tables show the percent of share gainloss of Hong
Kong and South Korea in 1969-74 period out of total gainloss in
entire 1965-74 period.
Table 2.6
Percent of Share Loss for Hong Kong occurring in 1969-






















Note: a- sign indicates share loss in 1969-74 period but gain
for the whole period.
b over 100% share loss means share gain in 1965-69 peribd
but loss for the whole period.
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Table 2.7
Percent of share gain for South Korea in 1969-74


























Note: a over 100% indicates share loss in the 1965-69 period
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
It can thus be concluded that, as far as Hong Kong is concerned,
sectoral performances are different from the aggregated trend. We
have ;the following observations. First, of the 10 industries in Table
2.6, there were 6 industries of which Hong Kong suffered absolute
decline in shares for the whole period of 1965-74. They were Textiles,
Transport, Furniture, Clothings, Footwear and Miscellaneous. Second,
the other 4 had a decline in share during the period 1969-74, but the
final share captured in 1974 was still higher than the original 1965
level. Third, there were only 2 industries, i.e., Machinery and Pro¬
fessional, of which Hong Kong scored share rises practically through¬
out the period. The following table shows Hong Kong share gain in
the 1965-1974 period.
Table 2.S











Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics,_ U. N.,
1965-1974.
As for South Korea, all the industries scored gains during the
1969-74 period. However, except for Footwear, Non-metal and Metal
Manufactures, the rise in share during the period 1969-74 was lower'
than expected.
An assessment of South Korea's responsibility in the Hong Kong
share loss after 1969 indicates that, in the period 1969-74, South
3
Korea was 52.6% responsible over all. The definition of South Korea's
responsibility is: South Korea's gain over Hong Kong's loss with a
measure of the importance of the share loss to the Hong Kong position,
to wit:
percent of Hong Kong position lost.
This approach was adopted for the following reasons:
1 The procedure described gives a measure relevant to assessing the
importance of South Korea competition from Hong Kong point of
view, and not from South Korea's. That is, Hong Kong is concerned
with how much of its market is being captured by South Korea.
2 . The alternative definition, i.e., South Korea's gain as a per¬
centage of Hong Kong share loss would definitely overrate South
Korea's competitive strength.
Responsibility, then, is based on circumstantial evidence only,
and not on an examination of underlying causes or on any evidence of
South Korea winning particular markets away from Hong Kong. At this
level of aggregation, a more precise account of South Korea's res-
3. 1.89- 0.662.34- 2.13 x 2.34- 2.132.34= 52.6%
ponsibility is necessarily impossible.
The following table summarises South Korea's responsibility in
Hong Kong share loss from the high point of Hong Kong market share
in ea:ch sector. The two sectors of which South Korea has gained more
than Hong Kong has lost were Food and Transport, while in Metal Manu¬
factures, South Korea has gained exactly what Hong Kong has lost.
Table 2.9
South Korea responsibility, by sector, for Hong Kong
share decline from date of decline


































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-
74.
2.3 Export Performanee by Country
Chapter 3 will show the pattern of Hong Kong and South Korea
share' change in third-country market. Nevertheless, a preview by area
is given here. Whether taking the total exports as a percentage of
total Group imports, or taking the exports of the Basic Industry as
a percentage of Group imports of the 12 basic industrial products,
South Korea's share has improved by more than 100% in all four coun¬
tries, with the least improvement in Japan. Incidentally, Japan is
the market which South Korea already had a higher market share than
Hong Kong throughout the period. Hong Kong in fact suffered a 20%
share loss in this market if all commodities are taken into account,
but a rise of share of 89.3% if only 12 basic industries are con¬
sidered. The best improvement occurred in the German market where
South Korean products were virtually non-existent in 1965. For the
whole period, South Korea had a share increase in the magnitude of
1700% if all commodities are considered, and an incredible share
rise of 6900% if only 12 basic industries are considered.
The best performance for Hong Kong also occurred in the German
market where Hong Kong scored an 87% share rise for all commodities,
and 105% if only 12 basic industries are considered. This reflected
the fact that while Germany is growing in economic strength, its im¬
ports also increase and is providing a demand for both Hong Kong and
South Korea products. Furthermore, it also means that Hong Kong and
South Korea are diversifying their export outlets.
The performances in these markets can be separated into three
categories. First, markets where Hong Kong had a higher share than
South Korea at the beginning and at the end of the Period: U.S.A.
and Germany. Second, South Korea had a higher share than Hong Kong at
the beginning and end of period: Japan. Third, market where South
Korea overtook Hong Kong in share: U.K. The following tables show
the performances of Hong Kong and South Korea in the 4 markets.
Table 2.10
Hong Kong Shares in the 4 Markets
All Industries 12 industries





























Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Table 2.11
South Korea Shares in the 4 Markets
All Industries






























Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
What is perhaps most noteworthy is the extent to which South
Korea is responsible for Hong Kong share loss in two of the trad¬
itional I-Iong Kong strong markets: U.S.A. and U.K. The two tables
below show that South Korea is 23% responsible for Hong Kong share
loss in the U.S.A. in both cases since 1970. As for U.K., South
Korea is 25% responsible for the Hong Kong share loss in U.K. if
only 12 basic industries are considered, but 1.63% responsible if all
industries are included. The important thing about the U.K. market is
that it is a traditional strong market for Hong Kong due to past
colonial tie. Now that U.K. had joined the EEC and preference can no
longer be given and Hong Kong share fell. Secondly, South Korea had
overtaken Hong Kong in share in 1968 (all industries) and 1969 (Basic
Industry) as principal suppliers of manufactured commodities to U.K.
This is an indication of South Korean challenge.
Table 2. l.2
South Korea Responsibility for Hong Kong share
















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-1974.
Table 2.13
South Korea Responsibility for Hong Kong share















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-1974.
Hong Kong share in the Japanese market remained rather constant,
while it scored a modest share gain in the German market. A detailed
discussion of share changes by sector by country will be given in
the next chapter. As a preview, the following is provided, which
divides the 12 basic industries by country.
Industries falling into Group 1, 5 or 6 indicate some improve-
4
ments for Hong Kong vis-a-vis South Korea in 1965-74 period. Of the
45 industrycountry listings in Table 2.14 below, only 11 fall into
one of these, three groups. The majority of industrycountry listings
fall into Group 2 which indicates a decrease in the Hong Kong lead
over South Korea. More importantly is Group 3 which indicates that,
4
in 13 industrycountry, South Korea has overtaken Hong Kong. The
total of Group 2 and 3 represents 56% of the grand total- again, an
indication of South Korean challenge.
The only case which Hong Kong overtook South Korea during this
period (Group 6) was Machinery in U.K.; and the only case which
Hong Kong has cut South Korea lead was Clothings, Hong Kong's strong¬
est industry, in Japan, South Korea's traditional market.
4. 3 in Japan, 4 in U.S.A. and 4 in Germany.
Table 2.14
Relative Performance in Markets Shares of Hong Kong and South Korea by lnd.~ust.uies, by Area. 196 74




























































Hong Kong ahead of South Korea in 1965 and its lead increased by 1974.
Hong Kong ahead of South Korea in 1965 but its lead decreased by 1974.
Hong Kong ahead of South Korea in 1965 but behind in 1974.
South Korea ahead of Hong Kong in 1965 and its lead increased by 1974.
south Korea ahead of Hong Kong in 1965 but its lead decreased by 1974.
South Korea ahead of Hong Kong in 1965 but behind in 1974.
CHAPTER III: RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHARE LOSS BY COUNTRY BY SECTOR
:In the foregoing discussion an analysis of Hong Kong and South
Korea aggregated export performances was given. The main feature of
that chapter is that Hong Kong share in the Group Market began to
decline since 1969 and South Korea was partly responsible, where
responsibility is based on circumstantial evidence.
However, one must be aware that the aggregated export trend of
Chart 2.3 is only a reflection of export performance of the two coun¬
tries in the Group Market as a whole, they have, in fact, different
fortunes in different markets. This chapter will consider the export
performance of the Basic Industry of Hong Kong in each of the four
markets and the South Korea responsibility for Ilong Kong share loss
will be quantified. Further, as mentioned before, major emphasis
will be placed on Hong Kong and South Korea export performance in
the U.S.A. market.
3.1 Hong Kong and South Korea Aggregated Export Shares in the
U.S. Market
The U.S. market is very important for both Hong Kong and South
Korea because a very large proportion of their exports are imported
by the U.S.A. For example, in 1974, total exports of all commodities
of Hong Kong was US$5,906,788,000, and her exports to U.S.A. was
US$1,560,700,000, i.e., one market alone took up nearly 30% of Hong
Kong's total exports. As for South Korea, the proportion was even
higher. Total exports in 1974 was US$4,460,371,000, and exports to'
U.S.A. of the same year amounted to US$1,493,775,000, i.e., 33%.
Table 3.1 below shows the exports of Hong Kong and South Korea to
U.S.A. as a percentage of their total exports to the world.
Table 3.1
Exports of Hong Kong and South Korea to USA
as a% of their total exports to the world
Year 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
HK in%
SK in%
28 28 29 33 35 36 35 33 28 26
35 38 43 52 50 47. 50 47 32 33
Source: Derived from the Yearbook of International. Trade Statistics,
U.N., 1965-1974.
The shares of Hong Kong and South Korea exports in the U.S.A.
4
market are shown in Table 3.2 and their trends in Chart 3.1.
Table 3.2








































































Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Chart 3.1
Hong Kong and South Korea Shares of U.S.Imports
Source: Derived from Table 3«2«
Chart 3.1 shows that Hong Kong has a rising share of exports
in the U.S. market from 1966 onxvards and peaked in 1970. Then her
share declined steadily up to 1973. In 1974, her share in the U.S.
market dropped sharply. On the other hand, South Korea exhibited a
more promising performance. She has a steady rising share from 1965
to 1973, a total of 9 years without setback. Her share fell slightly
in 1974, but the gap between she and Hong Kong has narrowed tremen¬
dously. In value term, Kong Kong was exporting US$1561 million and
South Korea. US$1491 million to the U.S.A. in 1974.
As for the performance of the 12 basic industries of Hong Kong
and South Korea in the U.S. market, the following table and chart
show the trend.
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Shares in
The U.S. Market
(value in USS'OOO)





























































Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-7'+.
Chart 3.2
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic industry Shares in
The U.S. Market
Source: Derived from Table 3.3.
The share of these 12 Hong Kong basic industries in the U.S.
market is similar to that of all industries as a whole. It rose from
1965 to the peak in 1970, then it started to fall. There was a re¬
vival in 1972, but just for 1 year and the final share at 2.88 was
lower than her share in 1965.
As for South Korea, the trend was a rapid rising one, display¬
ing the same characteristics as her all-industry performance in the
U.S. market. However, the point that should be noted is that al¬
though Hong Kong has a higher aggregated share than South Korea in
the U.S. market throughout the 10 year period, the gap between them
is closing fast. This is what we have been emphasising- the chal¬
lenge of South Korea exports.
Comparing the Hong Kong Basic Industry performance in Chart 3.2
with Chart 2.3, one cannot help but notice the similarity of the
trends. Both curves rose to the peak around 1970, then started to
fall. There was a revival in 1972, but it was only for one year. The
importance of the Basic Industry performance in the U.S. market is
thus underscored. Not only do they represent a very large percentage
of Hong Kong total exports to the U.S.A., in fact, their changing
fortunes in the U.S. market is also responsible for the rise and fall
of the total shares captured by Hong Kong exports in the world market.
Examining the all-industry shares captured by Hong Kong in the
U.S. market in 1965 and 1974, Hong Kong has lost 1.35% of the market.
Assuming linear share loss over the period, we would expect 44.4%
of the loss to be suffered from 1970 onward. However, the trend of
Hong Kong share in the U.S. market, as shown in Chart 3.1, was not
a continuous falling curve. In fact, the share went up in the late
601s and down in the early 70's.
In 1965, Hong Kong share in the U.S. market was 1.48%, it fell
to 1.47% in 1966. The share then climbed and reached the peak in 1970
at 2.26%, an increase of 54% over a 4-year period, averaging 13.4%
per annum. From 1970 onwards, her share declined continuously to 1.46%
in 1974, a fall of 35% over a 4-year period. However, the most rapid
fall occurred in 1974 when her market share fell from 2.06% to 1.46%,
a fall of 30% in just one year. Again assuming linear share loss over
the 1970-74 period, we would expect 25% of the loss to be suffered in
1974, what turned out was that 82% of the loss was suffered in 1974
alone. For all-industry, taking into account the gain in market shares
from 1965-70, the percent of share loss for Hong Kong occurring, in
1970-74 period out of total share loss in entire 1965-74 period was
2622%.
Comparing the Basic Industry shares captured by Hong Kong in
the U.S. market in 1965 and 1974, Hong Kong hcfs lost 0.69% of the
market. Her share rose from 2.65% in 1966 to the peak at 3.44% in
1970, a rise of 29.8% in 4 years. Then her share fell sharply in
1971 to 2.81%, a fall of 18.3% in 1 year. It then rose again to 3.06%
in 1972 and eventually settled at 2.88% in 1974. Over the period of
1970-74, Hong Kong had a fall in share of 16.28%. Thus, for the Basic
Industry, taking into account the gain in the market share from 1965
to 1970, the percent of share loss for Hong Kong occurring in 1970-
74 period out of total share loss in entire 1965-74 period was 2359%.
As far as all-industry is concerned, South Korea had a 397.31%
share rise throughout the whole period. Assuming linear share gain
over the whole period, we would expect 44.4% of the gain to occur
during the 1970-74 period. In fact, the 1970-74 period was only res¬
ponsible for 11.0% of the rise.
As for the Basic Industry performance in the U.S. market, South
Korea had a share rise of 376.74% over the whole period. The 1970-74
period was responsible for only 16.3% of the rise, again lower than
expected. However, one must point out that the South Korea export
trend in Chart 3.1 and 3.2 are nearly identical, indicating that the
Basic Industry performance in the U.S. market is a true reflection
of the general industrial performance, of South Korea in the U.S.
market.
3.2 Hong Kong Industrial Performance in the U.S. Market
A quick examination of Chart A13 through Chart A24 in the Appen¬
dix reveals that acceleration in the Hong Kong share loss from 1970-
1974 has been the pattern of six of the twelve basic industries. The
performances of these twelve industries can therefore be separated
into two groups:














Although the number of sectors with decreasing shares are nicely
balanced by the number of sectors with rising shares, they do not
carry the same weights, however. In actual fact, it is the influence
of the former which is responsible for the rising and falling shares
captured by Hong Kong in the U.S. market. The exports of these 6 in¬
dustries to U.S.A. as a percentage of Basic Industry exports is
presented in Table 3.4
Table 3.4
Exports of the 6 industries of Hong Kong with
falling shares to USA as a percentage of the
Basic Industry exports to USA
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
% 77.6 69.0 72.4 72.6 72.5 73.4 68.3 67.5 63.8 60.0
Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Of the six industries which suffered share losses i.n the 1970-74
period, five of them suffered share losses over the whole 1965-74 period.
Table 3.5 below shows the percent of share loss of the five industries
that suffered share loss over the whole period.
Table 3.5
Percent of share loss for Hong Kong occurring
















a. Sectors with more than 100% loss exhibited share
gain in period 1965-70.
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N.,
1965-74.
Table 3.5 shows that, except for Furniture, the losses for the
other four industries were greated than expected in the four-year
period. In three of the sectors (Clothings, Footwear and Miscellaneous),
there was a share gain until 1970,and then a loss outweighing the gain
from 1970 onwards. The greatest loss was suffered by Clothings. She,
being the largest export industry of Hong Kong, .'suffered a huge loss
of 1557% in 1970-74 period.
Another sector that should be mentioned is Metal Manufactures.
Although this sector scoDred a share gain over the 1965-74 period, she
in fact suffered a share loss of 23% in the 1970-74 period. The per¬
cent of share loss for the six sectors mentioned above in the 1970-74
period are as follows:
Table 3.6


















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N..
1965-74.
As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong shoved a share gain in the 1965-74
period in Food, Textiles, Non-metal, Machinery, Electric, Professional
and Metal Manufactures. Except for Metal Manufactures, these six sec¬
tors also had a share gain from 1970 onwards. In 1974, they comprised
about 38% of Hong Kong total exports to the U.S.A.
However, one sector should be singled out for attention, i.e..
Electric. As far as export earning is concerned, she is second only to
Clothings. In 1974, her export to U.S.A. totalled US$357 million,
equivalent to 25% of the total export earning from the U.S.A. The fol-
lowing table shows the percent of share gain in 1970-74 period out of
total gain in entire 1965-1974 period.
Table 3.7
Percent of share gain for Hong Kong in 1970-74















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N.,
1965-74.
Assuming linear share gain throughout the period, the gains fo:
all the six industries, with the exception of Textiles, are below
expected. This also implies that the rate of increase has slowed
down after 1970 and is of course not a healthy sign. By 1974, Hong
Kong had 1.46% of the U.S. market in all-manufactures imports and
South Korea controlled 1.39%. The share gain for the six sectors in
1970-74 period alone is shown in Table 3.8.
Table ,3.8















Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1970-74.
33 South Korea Industrial Performance in the U.S.Market
Comparing the total share captured by South Korea in the U.S.
market in 1S65 and 1974, South Korea had an increase in share in the
magnitude of 379%. Assuming linear share gain over the 1965-74 period,
we would expect 44.4% of the total gain to occur from 1970 onwards.
The percent of share gain for South Korea occurring in 1970-74 as a
proportion of total gain in entire 1965-74 period and the percent of
share gain in 1970-74 period alone are shown in Table 3.9 and Table
3.10.
For the 12 basic industries under consideration here, all of them
scored net gain over the period 1965-74. But, with the exception of
Professional and Non-metal, the gain for all industries in the 1970-
74 period were all below expected. This means that for these ten
industries, their share gain took off in the early period up to 1970,
then their rates of increase slowed down after 1970. This is, however,
in line with the aggregated figure. For all the twelve industries
taken as a whole, the percent of share gain in 1970-74- out of total
share gain in entire 1965-74 period was only 11%.
As for Non-metal, her high rate of increase in share gain was
due to the fact that it incurred a share loss in the period 1965-74.
The same applied to Professional. The trends of these 12 basic indus-
tries, which represent more than 70% of South Korea exports to the U.S.
in 1974, thus explains the movement of the aggregated curve of Chart
3.2.
Table 3.9
Percent of Share Gain for South Korea occurring ir






























Kote: a, sector with more than 100% gain exhibited
share loss in 1965-70 period.
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics.. U.N.
1965-74.
Table 7nlO



























Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N.
1965-74.
Although only 12 industries are discussed in this comparative
study, two other industries should also be mentioned in the Korean
case. They are Wood and Iron. Their exports accounted for US$404 m.
or 27.5% of total export to the U.S.A. in 1974. Comparison of these
two industries of Hong Kong and South Korea was not made because
the Wood and the Iron Industries are virtually non-existent in Hong
Kong as far as exports are concerned. The Wood export of South Korea
accounted for more than 23% of total U.S. Wood import in 1973. The
following table shows the share gains of these two industries.
Table; 3.11






Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74
The total share gain for Iron for the period 1965-74 was not
made because South Korea exported virtually no Iron to the U.S.A. in
1965 and the percentage gain was so large that it is meaningless.
An assessment of South Korea's responsibility in the Hong
Kong share loss indicates.that, in the 1970-74 period, South Korea
was 18? 2% responsible overall. The table below summarises South Korea's
responsibility in Hong Kong share loss from the high point of Hong
Kong market share in those sectors where Hong Kong recorded share
losses. Of the five industries, only in Footwear that South Korea has
gained more than Hong Kong has lost. A sector-by-sector follows.
Table 3.12
South Korea Responsibility, by sector, for Hong






















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
3 .4 Sec tor-by-Sector Analysis i n the U.S. Market
a.Food
The export share of Food from Hong KOng to U.S.A. was very
constant over the 10 year period from 1965~74. It ranged between 0.1%
to 0.15%. As for South Korea, the share increased from 0.08% in 1965
to 0.33% in 1974. However, the trend was not monotonic. There was a
sharp fall from 0.27% in 1969 to 0.15% in 1971, a drastic increase in
the next two years to 0.37% in 1973.
The trends reveal the basic difference of the two countries.
It is not to be expected for Hong Kong which has virtually no pri¬
mary sectoi export large amount of food and live animals to the U.S.A
Although South Korea has a larger share, but it is rather insig¬
nificant. Her export accounts for less than 0.5% of total U.S. imports.
However, irrespective of the small share, the Food industry still
contributed US$12 million and US$31 million to the Hong Kong and
South Korea export earnings respectively in 1974.
b. Textiles
This is an important export industry for both Hong Kong and
South Korea, earning US$98 million and US$42 million respectively
for Hong Kong and South Korea in 1974. Hong Kong dominated the export
scene throughout the 1965-74 period and the gap between the two coun¬
tries' exports to U.S.A. was by means narrowed after ten years com¬
petition.
Trendwise, the share captured by Hong Kong has increased from
3.01% in 1965 to 6% in 1974. However, during the period of 1966 to
1972, the share has remained constant around 4%. As for South
Korea, her share has also increased from 0.91% in 1965 to 2.61% in
1974. Judging from the two trends, it can be assumed that Korean
textiles industry is not yet a challenge for Hong Kong.
c.Non-metal:
This sector is relatively unimportant for Hong Kong and South
Korea, bringing US$11 million ana US$6.6 million export earnings
for Hong Kong and South Korea respectively in 1974.
Sharewise, neither country captured more than 1% of the total
U.S. market for Non-metal imports. Though the share has increased
from 0.2% to 0.6% for Hong Kong and from 0.1% to 0.4% for South
Korea, they are just too small to warrant serious consideration.
d. Machinery:
South Korea exported more than Hong Kong throughout the period,
but they exert no significant influence on the U.S. market. Their
combined exports never exceeded 1% of total U.S. imports of Machin¬
ery. However, as far as export earnings are concerned, they have
their contributions. In 1974, export of machinery brought in US$11.8
million and US$26.9 million earnings for Hong Kong and South Korea
respectively.
e.Electric Machinery:
This industry earns an enormous amount of export revenue
for both countries and ranked second and third in the earning hier--
achies of Hong Kong and South Korea respectively in 1974 as far as
export to U.S.A. is concerned. Export values to U.S.A. amounted to
US$357 million and US$245 million for Hong Kong and South Korea res¬
pectively. Sharewise, Hong Kong captured 6.6% and South Korea 4.5%
of total U.S. import of electric machinery.
As for their trends, Hong Kong has a sharp rise at the begin¬
ning of the period. Its share increased from 5% in 1965 to 6% in
1966. The share then remained almost constant for a period of 5
years. It eventually rose to 6.6% in 1974. The trend for South Korea
is a rising one. Except for a slight fall in 1970, there was no set
back for South Korea export to U.S.A. Although it is true to say that
Hong Kong export of electric machinery still dominates the scene, the
gap between them is closing rapidly.
f. Professional:
The trend of this industry for the two countries are more or
less the same, both rising throughout. In 1974, export earnings of
this industry was US$36 million for Hong Kong and US$10 million for
South Korea.
Comparing the shares obtained in 1974 and 1965, the six indus¬
tries discussed above all have rising share at the end of the per-
iod. Except for Food of which South Korea overtook Hong Kong at the
beginning, and Machinery of which South Korea dominated throughout,
South Korean industries are still not yet a severe challenge for Hong
Kong products in the U.S.A. market. As for the six industries which
have falling shares, the story is quite different.
g. Meta1 manufactures
This is one of the typical example of the South Korean chal¬
lenge. First, it is an important export industry for both Hong Kong
and South Korea, earning US$33 million for Hong Kong and US$54 mill¬
ion for South Korea in 1974. Secondly, the export share of Hong Kong
in the U.S. market has declined since 1970 and South Korea is 88%
responsible. Thirdly, South Korea has overtaken Hong Kong in ex-
porting metal manufactures to U.S.A. in 1974. In fact, the trends of
the two countries look like mirrow image of the other.
h. Transport:
The share of this particular Hong Kong industry in the U.S.A.
market has been falling since 1965, except for 1967 when she has
a slight increase. It has declined from 0.23% in 1965 to 0.04%
in 1974 and South Korea is 100% responsible.
On the other hand, the share for South Korea has increased
from 0.01% .in 1965 to 0.24% in 1974. The highest increase occurred
in 1971-74 when she had a 900% increase in a span of three years.
Her share overtook I-Iong Kong in 1973.
The earnings for this industry remained rather constant for
Hong Kong, but increased enormously for the South Korea industry.
Between 1965 and 1974, the exporting earnings for this industry has
increased nearly 200 folds and was bringing in US$31 million for
South Korea in 1974,
i. Furniture:
This is a small industry for both countries as far as experts
are concerned. In value term export earnings for Hong Kong totalled
US$16 million in 1974, whereas for South Korea, it was only US$5 mil¬
lion in the same year.
Hong Kong share has been declining since 1965, and reached 3%
in 1972. Then it rose by 1% to 4%.and levelled off in 1974. As for
South Korea, it has increased from 0.1% to 1% in 1974. According to
estimation, South Korea is only 15% 'responsible for the Hong Kong
share decline.
j. Clothings:
This is the most important and highest export earning industry
for Hong Kong, bringing over US$450 million export revenue back to
Hong Kong in 1974. Its export trend can be diveaed into two periods.
First, from 1964-68, it has a rising share, capturing nearly one
quarter of the total market of U.S. import of Clothings. From 1968
to 1974, its share declined and then stablised at around 20%.
As for South Korea, it is also the highest export earning indus¬
try. In 1974, its export earning totalled US$307 million with a cap-
tured share of 13% of total U.S. iirport of Clothings,
Examining Chart A21 in the Appendix, we have the following
observations. First, Hong Kong export dominated the scene throughout
the period. Second, the share increase for South Korea was rather
rapid. Except for a slight fall in 1973, South Korea has an increase
in share throughout the 11 year period. Third, the share gap between
the two countries has narrowed tremendously from 16% in 1964 to only
6% in 1974. If the trend continues, it is quite possible that South
Korea might overtake Hong Kong in the near future. Bearing in mind
that Clothings exports represent more than 30% of all Hong Kong ex¬
ports to the U.S.A. in this period, realisation of this would spill
danger for the economy in general, and for the Clothings industry in
particular. The following table shows the Hong Kong Clothings exports
to U.S.A. as a percentage of total exports to the U.S.A.
The importance of the Clothings is evident from the table®
While the Clothings industry was partly responsible for the decline
in share of the aggregated export curve, the South Korea Clothings
industry was 22% responsible for thedecline of the Hong Kong Clothings
industry from 1968 to 1974.
Table 3.13
Clothings export to the U.S.A. as a percentage
of total Basic industry exports to the U.S.A.
Year 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
% 34' 31 33 34 32 30 35 32 30 30
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics; U.N., 1960-74 and
Yearbook of International Trade Statisties, U.N., 1965-74.
k. Footwear:
Starting from a lower position in 1964, South Korea Footwear in¬
dustry overtook Hong Kong in 1965. From then onwards, the South Korea
industry dominated the scene, especially after 1969 when her share
shot up. On the other hand, the share for Hong Kong started to fall.
from 1966 to 1973. Only in 1974 that she has a slight increase in
share. According to calculation, South Korea was 285% responsible
for the share loss of Hong Kong from 1966 onwards. In 1974, South
Korea was exporting US$91 million Footwear to the U.S.A. as com¬
pared to only US$9 million for Hong Kong.
m. Miscellaneous:
This is the second highest export earning industry for Hong
Kong, bringing US$347 million export earnings in 1974. It is also
important for South Korea, bringing in US$144 million revenue in the
same year.
Both countries have a share rise from 1964 onwards and reached
the peak in 1970 when Hong Kong and South Korea captured 16.6%
and 5% of the U.S. market respectively. The share for Hong Kong then
started to fall continuously to 9% in 1974, losing 45% of her share.
As for South Korea, its share also fell in 1971, but stabilised in
1972, rose in 1973, and stabilised again in 1974 at 3.7%
It is, however, not possible to assess the South Korea res¬
ponsibility for the decline of Hong Kong share in the U.S. market
because South Korea also had a share loss of 21% in the same period.
This thus concludes the analysis of the six sectors of Hong
Kong that have falling shares. As mentioned earlier, these six in¬
dustries are very important for Hong Kong export earnings and are
chiefly responsible for the fall in share of the aggregated curve.
Moreover, the challenge from South Korea is obvious for these six
industries. For Metal manufactures. Transport, and Footwear, South
Korea have overtaken Hong Kong in shares. As for other industries,
the gap between the two countries -have narrowed greatly. Since the
present prosperity of Hong Kong depends on her exports to the World
in general, and to the U.S.A. in particular, and as the present
trend clearly indicates that, at least for these six industries, Hong
Kong exports may be adversely affected the the U.S. market by South
Korea's competition. The following table summarises Hong Kong share
decline and South Korea responsibility by sector in the U.S. market.
Table 3.14





































































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N,, I965-77c
2
3.5 Hong Kong arid South Korea Export Performance in the German Market
The German market is relatively small as compared th the U.S.
market- it accounted for less than 10% of the total exports of Hong
Kong and South Korea. However, this market is becoming more and more
important. Paralle] to her growing prosperity and economic strength,
the German market is taking up a higher and higher percentage of Hong
Kong and South Korea exports, as evident from the following table.
Table 3.15
Exports of HK and SK to Germany as a Percentage
of Their Total Exports to the World
Year 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
HK in%
SK in%
6.0 5.7 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.7 6.8 8.1 7.6 8.5
1.8 2.8 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.3 5.9 3.2 3.7 5.4
Source. Derived from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N.,
1965-74.
As for the market shares captured by Hong Kong and South Korea
Basic Industry, Table 3.16 and Chart 3.3 shows the trends. Both coun¬
tries have rising shares over the period, though not exceeding 2%
of the market.
Table 5
liK and SK Basic Industry Shares in the German Marketmt, .Tiipi ii«Miir ('ran.'-i. m.«« ii.a.u. ••rci'. jiv, «.-x m.tar--«» -av..«•.—
Sources Derived from Table 316
In 1374, Hong Kong Basic Industry had 1.52% of the German market
while South Korea had 0.7%. As for individual, industry performance,
the figures vary. Of the 12 Hong Kong basic industries considered,
6 of them scored share rises over the period. They were Non-metal,
Metal manfuactures, Machinery, Electric, Professional and Miscellan¬
eous. Four other industries had share losses over the period and they
were Textiles, Footwear, Clothings and Furnitures. The share captured
by Food remained the same at 0.01% over the period while Transport
had no export to Germany at the beginning and at the end of the per¬
iod.
Table 3-16
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Shares in








































































Source Commodity Trade Statistics and Yearbook of International
Tradg Statistics t U.NM 1963-197®
As for South Korea, ten of the twelve industries scored share
rises over the period. The exceptions were Furntiure of which South
Korea still had to export to Germany, and Transport for which 1974
was the first year that South Korea had export of this product to
Germany.
Since Hong Kong has a share rise in the German market over the
period 1965-74, it is thus not necessary to estimate the South Korea
responsibility for Hong Kong share losses for all-industry as a whole.
However, in certain industries of which Hong Kong suffered share de¬
cline, South Korea responsibility is calculated. From, the following
table we can see that South Korea was 150% responsible for Hong Kong
share loss in the Textiles industry, 26% for Clothings, 22.6% for
Footwear, and 11.5% for Miscellaneous. Of the 12 sectors, South Korea
has overtaken Hong Kong in Food, Textiles, Non-metal, Transport,
and obtained the same market share as Hong Kong in Machinery. The
strongest Hong Kong sector is of course Clothings which controlled
11.4% of the German market and the weakest is Transport of which there
was no export in 1974. In other industries such as Metal manufactures,
Electric, Professional and Miscellaneous, Hong Kong still has a lead
over its South Korea counterparts. The following table summarises
Hong Kong share decline and South Korea responsibility by sector in
the German market.
Table 3.17






























































































Note 1: Hong Kong has no export in 197+ while South Korea has no export in 1971.
2; South Korea has no export for the whole oeriod.
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N„, 1965-7+.
1965
3.6 Hong Kong and South Korea Export Performance in the U.K.Market
Due to the colonial tie in the past, U.K. was a traditional
market for Hong Kong exports. For example, in 1965, 13.9% of Hong
Kong total export went to the U.K.. However, as Table 3.18 shows
that, the percentage of Hong Kong exports to the U.K. out of her
total exports to the world has been declining over time. In 1974,
only 9.74% of Hong Kong's total exports went to the U.K. market. If
this means that Hong Kong is diversifying its export outlets, this
is of course a good thing. But, if the falling trend reflects the
fact that Hong Kong products are being out-competed by other LDC's
products, this spills danger. As for South Korea, the percentage was
almost constant and remained below 3%.
Table 3.18
Exports of Hong Kong and South Korea to U.K. as
a percentage of their total exports to the world
Year 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
HK in% 13.9 13.5 13.1 12.7 11.6 10.6 11.7 11.8 11.2 9.8
SK in% 2.1 2.0 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.4
Source: Derived from the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
U.N., 1965-74.
Our main concern in the U.K. market remains the same, i.e., the
export performance of the Basic Industry of the two countries. In
Table 3.19 and Chart 3.4, we observe that Hong Kong Basic Industry had
a rising share in the U.K. market from 1965 to 1972, the ye r she
joined the Common Market. The only exception was the.fall in share in
1969. After 1972, her share began to decline, first slightly in 1973,
then sharply in 197!U In fact, Hong Kong lost 15-7, of its share in
1974 alone
As for South Korea, she has a constant but negligible share from
1965 to 1971 when her share began to climb. Between 1971 and 1974,
South Korea had a share rise of 600%. In 1974, Hong Kong Basic Industry
has 2.08% of the U.K. Basic Industry imports while South Korea had
only 0.35%.
As for the export performances of individual industries, Hong Kong
did not do well in U.K. Of the 12 industries, 6 of them had share
declines continuously since 1968. They were Textiles, Transport,
Furniture, Clothings, Footwear and Professional. In fact, the first
three had share declines since 1965. Clothings, which accounted for
37.8% of total U.K. Clothings import in 1966, had a continuous share
decline since that year. In 1974, Hong Kong accounted for 26.5% of
total U.K. Clothings imports, a loss of 30% in 9 years. Another in¬
dustry that should be mentioned is the Footwear industry. In 1968,
she accounted for 23.83% of total U.K. Footwear imports. However,
over the years, her share declined and in 1974 the industry has lost
65.8% of her share since 1968.
As for the other 6 industries, only Machinery had a share rise
all the way to 1974. However, this is a rather small industry as far
as export is concerned. In 1974, she accounted for only 1% of total
U.K. Machinery import, valued at US$4.5 million. As for Food, Metal
manfuactures and Electric, they had share rises up to 1972, then their
shares began to fall. But the important thing is that, in 1974, their
export values declined absolutely, for the first time in this period.
The same applies to Non-metal which had a share decline in 1974 for
the first time. The export performance of these four industries coin¬
cided nicely with the trend curve in Chartp which shows that Hong
Kong had a slight share decline in 1973, then a sharp fall in 1974
in the U.K. market. As for Miscellaneous, the share rose to peak in
1970, capturing nearly 10% of the U.K. market in Miscellaneous pro--
ducts. Then the share began to fall. In 1974, this industry had only
6.42% of the U.K. market, losing 30% of the share in a four year
period.
As for South Korea, the U.K. market is relatively unimportant.
Except for Clothing and Footwear which captured 4.04% and 2.75% of
the U.K. market respectively in 1974, none of the other 10 industries
captured more than 1% of the market. In fact, the Transport and the
Furniture industries had no exports to U.K. even in 1974.
Table 319
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Share



































































Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
Chart 3.4
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Shares





66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 7
-SK
Source: Derived from Table 3-19®
Although Hong Kong has a sharp fall in share in the U.K. market
in 1974, she still has a higher market share than South Korea in every
industry. The challenge exerted by South Korea is therefore not very-
significant, as evident by their responsibilities in the following
table. Except for Transport and Furniture of which South Korea still
has no export to U.K., and Machinery of which Hong Kong share is
still increasing, South Korea was never more than 16% responsible for
Hong Kong's losses. Clothings remained Hong Kong's strongest sector
in this market and Food the weakest. The following table shows the
Hong Kong share decline and South Korea responsibilities by sector.
Table 3.20





































































































South Korea has no exports
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1965-74.
3
3.7 Hong Kong and South Korea Export Per romance in the Japanese Market
Contrary to the U.K. market, this is a traditional market for
South Korea due mainly to geographical proximity and Japanese occupa¬
tion during the World War II. The following table shows the exports
of Hong Kong and South Korea to Japan as a percentage of their total
exports to the world.
Table 3.21
Exports of Hong Kong and South Korea to Japan as a
Percentage of their total exports to the world
Year 65 66 .67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
HK in% 5.5 5.8 2.2 2.2 6.5 7.1 6.6 6.8 9.6 6.9
SK in% 25.1 26.5 26.5 21.9 21.4 28.1 .24.5 25.1 38.5 30.9
Source: Derived from the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
U.N., 1965-74.
The importance of the Japanese market to South Korea is thus
obvious- it took up nearly 40% of total South Korea exports to the
world in 1973. For the trend as a whole, it has been quite erratic,
going up and down all the way. On the other hand, Hong Kong exports
exhibite a rather constant but slightly rising trend, reaching the
peak at 1973, same as South Korea.
The performance of the Basic Industry of the two countries in
Japan are that both had a steady rising share at the beginning of the
period up to 1969. From 1969 onwards South Korea share shot up, es¬
pecially in 1973 when she had a share rise of 109.2% in one year. On
the other hand, Hong Kong continued to maintain its nearly constant
trend, reaching the peak at 1.41% in 1973. The shares captured by Hong
Kong and South Korea Basic Industry in Japan in the period 1965-74
are presented in Table 3.22 and Chart 3..
Chart 35
Hong Kong and South Korea Basic Industry Shares
in the Japan Market
Source: Derived from Table 322
Table 322








































































Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, U«N,, 1963-7
As for individual industry performances, South Korea had a lead
over Hong Kong in each and every one of the 12 basic industries. The
only industry of which Hong Kong nearly caught up with South Korea
was Furniture- South Korea had 7.68% and Hong Kong 6.96% of the Jap¬
anese Furniture market.
Since Hong Kong had a slight share rise over the whole range,
it is thus not appropriate to calculate South Korea responsibility
for Hong Kong share loss. However, as for individual industry, the
following table shows South Korea, responsibility for Hong Kong share
losses in 9 of the 12 industries. The three exceptions were Transport
and Clothings of which both Hong Kong and South Korea scored share
losses, and Metal manufactures, of which Hong Kong had a share rise
over the whole period. For the 3 strongest sectors of Hong Kong in
this area, i.e., Clothings, Furniture and Metal manufactures, South
Korea did not gain much ground. But for the other sectors, with the
exception of one, South Korea was more than 100% responsible for Hong
Kong share losses. The exception was Non-metal of which South Korea
was only 68.54% responsible.
However, one should realise that Hong Kong did not do as
bad as Table 3.23 reveals. That table only shows that, compared with
the high points, nine of the twelve industries reported share losses.
In fact, of the 12 industries considered, only 5 of them registered
share losses over the 1965-74 period. They were Food, Non-metal,
Machinery, Furniture and Footwear. As for Textiles, Metal manufactures,
Electric, Clothings, Professional and Miscellaneous, six of the most
important and strongest industries of Hong Kong, there were share rises
over the 1965-74 period. It is certain that these six industries are
responsible for the steady rising trend of Hong Kong in Chart 3.5
As for Transport, there was no export to Japan in 1974.
As for South Korea, all industries scored share rises over the
period 1965-74. In 1974, South Korea controlled 41% of Footwear, 37%
of Clothings, 17% of Textiles, 10% of Metal manfuactures and Electric,
and 8% of Miscellaneous products market in Japan. The importance of
the Japan market to South Korea and the strength of the South Korean
industries in Japan is clear beyond doubt.
This concludes the discussion of the export performances of Hong
Kong and South Korea Basic Industry in each of the four markets. Of
course, we have not considered competition from other Far East coun¬
tries, especially Taiwan. Yet Taiwan may be chiefly responsible for
the decline in the Hong Kong share position in the Group market from
1970 onwards. As the previous discussions show, the acceleration in
the Hong Kong share loss during the 1970-74 period was not matched by
an acceleration in South Korea share gain. This study does not inves¬
tigate the role of Taiwan which exports virtually the same commodities
to the world. A complete treatment of the causes of the Hong Kong
share loss would necessitate discussion of Taiwan and other competitors.
Here only South Korea's effect is considered.
Table 3.23
Hong Kong Share Decline and






































































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, U.N., 1963-74®
Chapter IV
1
Comparative Structure of I-Iorig Kong tind South Korea Trade
4.1 Definitions
In this chapter the structure of Hong Kong and South Korea
manufactured exports will be discussed, including certain aspects of
changes in strucutre over the 1965-1974 period. The main analytical
2
tool used will be two simple concepts: sector intensity and area
intensity of trade.
The following definitions will apply throughout this chapter.
Let:
h= (1.... 12 basic industries);
i= (Kong Kong, South Korea);
j= (U.S.A., U.K., Germany, Japan);
country i1s exports;
country i's exports to j-area market;
country i's export of h-sector;
country i's export of h-sector to j-area market?
M- total imports;
j-area market imports;
total import of h-sector;
j-area market imports of h-sector;
1. This chapter followed closely the approach used by J.E. Roemer, U.S.¬
Japanese Competition in International Markets, Research Series Ho. 22,
Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley,
1975. The intensity of trade concept was first used by A.J. Brown,
Applied Economics: Aspects of World Economy in War and Peace (London,
1947)
2. Sector is defined here as equivalent to an industry.
country i's export as a share of total imports;
country i1s export to j as a share of j area market
imports
country i's export of h as a share of total h imports;
country i's export of h to j-area market as a share of
j-area h-sector imports;
i's h-sector intensity of trade in j-area;
i's j-area intensity of trade in h-sector;
i's j-area intensity of trade;
i's h-sector intensity of trade
The sector intensity of trade measures the extent to which country
i depends on a particular sector in its exports to a given area; area
intensity measures the importance of a particular area in country i's
exports of a given sector. A normal dependence on area j in i's
exports of h would rendei
4
1, for instance. Clearly, an appropriate
average of the is 1; the same being true for the the and
the Then the weighting systems are given by:





The first necessity in a study of competition in trades is to
define the concept of strong sector and strong area for a particular
country's trade. We shall say that a sector h is stronger than-sector k
for country i if
This of course means that the sector of larger market share is
the strong sector. Similarly, area j is stronger than area£ for
i-country if
In a particular area j we say that h-sector is stronger than
k-sector for country i if
And, in a particular sector h, the j-area will be said to be
stronger than the £-area when
Note that these concepts involve the structure of one country's
(i's) trade; Hong Kong trade is not compared to South Korea trade, but
to other parts of Hong Kong trade. Of course, a closer glance shows
that there is implicit multi-country comparison in the concept of
strength since market shares are involved. It is important to note
that, however, strength is not defined in terms of share loss over a
period of time. Empirical results on Hong Kong share loss and South
Korea's responsibility have been discussed in the earlier chapters.
4.2 Hong Kong and South Korea Balance of Trade Analysis
Table 4.1 shows the sector intensities( Group) of Hong Kong
and South Korea trade in 1965 and 1974. Note that South Korea depends
less on its strongest sectors than Hong Kong does on its strongest.
That is, the South Korea sector intensity for its strongest sector
(Clothing) is 5.37, while Hong Kong sector intensity for its strongest
sector (also Clothing) is 7.43 in 1974. The first look at the structure
of trade here will be an examination of its balance. The balance
concept is made more precise by defining the Hong Kong sector balance
as the average deviation from 1 of the Hong Kong sector intensities.
That is,
Table 4.1


































































1.88 1.07 1.55 1.13
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations
1965-1974
Note that this average does not weight each term with its appro¬
priate importance in the total exports— in this case per equation
(2). Simply, then, a country's trade will be well-balanced, by this
definition, if it has about the same share of the world market in all
sectors.
Two observations about the balance of trade can be made from the
U-values in Table 4.1. First, South Korea is better sector balanced
than Hong Kong trade in 1965. Second, in 194, both countries had a
better sector balance than before, but Hong Kong has improved more
than South Korea and is better balanced than South Korea by a fraction.
..The following Table shows the results of sector-balance calculation
for each country. That is, define
as the sector-balance of i's trade in j-area.
Table 4.2
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1965 1.88 1.60 1.42 1.68 2.45 1.90 3.42 0.53 4.90 2.78
1974 1.07 1.13 1.29 1.29 1.15 0.89 2.01 0.74 1.98 1.05
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965-1974.
The table shows that:
(1) with the exception of South Korea in the U.K. market, both Hong
Kong and South Korea become more balanced in 1974;
(2 except in Group intensities where Hong Kong has a better balance,
and in U.S.A. where Hong Kong and South Korea have the same inten¬
sities, South Korea is better balanced than Hong Kong in U.K.,
Germany and Japan in 1974;
(3) Hong Kong trade balance is best in the Group while South Korea in
in Germany. The figure for South Korea in U.K. is misleading
because South Korea has exports to U.K. in just 4 commodities;
(4) Hong Kong trade balance is very unbalanced in U.K.
In 1974, South Korea shows a definitely more mature structure.
The assumption here is that well-balanced trade is a sign of a mature
economy. This is, of course, a first order observation, since balance
will change because of foreign investment replacing trade in certain
sectors faster than others and because of different tariff treatment.
It also appears that there is no correlation between strong areas
and sector balance for both countries. To make this more precise, we
will examine the relationship between sector-balance in an area
and area strength for trade in the following two tables.
Table 4.3
Area Strength Ranked Against Sector-Balance, By Area
Hong Kong, 1974





















Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965-74.
Table 4.4
Area Strenath Ranked Aqainst Sector-Balance. By Area
Qr-in-hVi ITryp;=. I Q74





















Source: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1974.
The spearman coefficient is 0 for both countries, indicating that
strong area and better sector balance are not correlated. Thus, the
best-sector-balance is not achieved in the strongest areas. It seems
obvious that good balance is not a consequence of area strength. One
implication of this finding is that, though Hong Kong and South Korea
desires a fair share of every sector market in any given area, they
are not mature enough to do so. Further, it also means that they have
not penetrated each market with equal success.
Next, area balances are examined. Let the area balance m. be
defined as:
The following table shows the area intensities and the area balance
for Hong Kong and South Korea in 1965 and 1974. Hong Kong is better area
balance than South Korea in both years. The table also shows that both
Hong Kong and South Korea balances have improved over the period. A
comparison with Table 4.1 shows that Hong Kong and South Korea trade is
much better area balance than sector balance.
Table 4.5
Hong Kong and South Korea Area Intensities of Trade
1965 and 1974
Honq Konq























m= 0.48 m= 0.29 m= 1.46 m= 0.96
Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, 1965-1974.
The area intensity concept tells how each country is fairing
against the competition in one area relative to how it is fairing in
other areas. Table 4.6 below shows the absolute reliance of Hong Kong
and South Korea on different area— i.e., the area composition of exports.
Both Hong Kong and South Korea's strongest area i.e., U.S.A. has declined
in importance. As for Hong Kong, the importance of U.K., the second
largest market for Hong Kong, has also declined. Offsetting this decline
is the rise of German market whose imports from Hong Kong is nearly as
much as U.K. in 1974. As for South Korea, the importance of the second
largest market, i.e., Japan, has increased. The exports to Germany and
U.K. has also increased.
Table 4.6


























Source: Derived from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United
Nations, 1965 and 1974.
A table of area balances by sector is now constructed, for 1965
and 1974. From Table 4.7 below, it appears that:
(1) In 5 of the 12 sectors, Hong Kong trade became more unbalanced from
1965 to 1974, 3 of them were important sectors.
(2) South Korea trade has became more balanced in 10 of the 12 sectors.
The sector which has become unbalanced is Transport, due mainly to
the German market demand for South Korea Transport equipments in
1974. In 1965, no Transport was exported to Germany. Judgement
also cannot be passed on the trade balance of Furniture because ther
was no Furniture export by South Korea in 1965.
(3) In 11 of the 12 sectors the Hong Kong area balance is better than
South Korea's in 1974.
Tab!e 4.7
Area Balance by Secto





































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965
and 1974.
We have found in the previous discussion that the best sector-
balance is not achieved in the strongest areas (Tables 4.3 and 4.4),
we now would like to test whether the strongest sectors are the best
area balanced by ranking the 12 sectors by (1) their strength for Hong
Kong (that is, by world sector intensity) and (2) by their area balance
(the size of their These rankings, calculated for 1965 and 1974,
are presented in Table 4.8 mid 4.9 below.
Table 4.8








Rank by World Rank by Area











































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965
and 1974.
Table 4__9





















































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965
and 1974.
0.05 0.43
Except for South Korea in 1974, the general impression is that
there is no correlation between strong sector with area balance. One
implication of these correlation of sector strength with area balance
is that although both countries seek trade in all areas, a strong sector
does not guarantee that it will be strong in all areas equally. The
result shows that the strong sectors for Hong Kong and South Korea do
not capture its fair share in all areas, hence a good area balance.
To see if the difference in strength of the correlation betv.Teen
the Hong Kong and South Korea resulted from rank correlation possibly
hide an effect which might be visible by examining absolute values of
anc a computation was made. If area balance correlates with sector
intensity (i.e., sector strength), one would expec to be fairly










































Source: Derived from Table 4.1 and 4.7.
As the above Table shows, the values of changes as h varies,
indicating that the rank correlations given above are accurate indicators,
that is, no correlation between area balance and sector strenqth.
4.3 Ilong Kong and South Korea Better-Than--Average Sectors
In this section the strength of the different sectors is described
within each area, and changes over time are observed. Table 4.12—4.19
list the 12 basic sectors for each area, ordered according to their
strength in 1974 and 1965. A sector is called better-than-average sector
(BTA) if its sector intensity in that area is greater than 1. However,
the two main strong industries for South Korea, i.e., wood and iron
are not included for the sake of comparability, it is hoped that the
exclusion would not introduce too much distortion tc the Korean picture.
A general observation is that the relative strength of Hong Kong
sectors have changed very little in all areas as indicated by the
Spearman Coefficients in Table 4.11 below. As for South Korea, changes'
have taken place most in Germany, then in U.K. This was due to the fact
that only 5 and 4 industries had exports to Germany and U.K. respectively
in 1965. If we calculate the Spearman coefficient for only these
industries, then the result is that not much changes have taken place,
as indicated by the Spearman coefficients in parenthesis.
Table 4.11
Spearman's Coefficient of 1974 Ranking of Sectors
by Strength Against 1965 Ranking
World U.S.A. U.K. Germany Japan
Hong Kong 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.77 0.92
South Korea 0.82 0.85 0.41(0.5) 0.22(0.68) 0.45
Source: Derived from Table 4.12— 4.19.
4.3.1 U.S.A. Market
Hong Kong had a better sector balance than South Korea in U.S.A.
in 1965. The sector balance for the two countries were equal in 1974,
this, of course, means that South Korea improved more than Hong Kong
in the 10 years period.
For Hong Kong, Clothing was and is the strongest sector in the
U.S.A.; Miscellaneous was and is the second strongest sector. In 1965,
Machinery, Food, Non-Metal and Transport were the 4 weakest sectors;
they remained the 4 weakest sectors, though the order has changed to
Transport, Food, Machinery and Non-Metal.
In South Korea, Footwear was the strongest sector, closely followed
by Clothing. In 1974, the order has reversed and Clothing has taken
over the lead. On the other hand, Transport remained the weakest sector
at the beginning and the end of the 1965-74 period.
To make this more precise, we have calculated the Spearman coeffi¬
cients for the 2 countries. As far as Hong Kong is concerned, the Spearman
coefficient of 0.92 is significant at the 1% level, indicating that strong
sectors remain the strong sectors and not much change has taken place
over the 10 year period. As for South Korea, the Spearman coefficient
is 0.85, indicating that more changes have taken place than Hong Kong.
However, within the country itself, the order of strength has not changed
much, and the coefficient is also significant at 1% level.
The 5 BTA sectors for Hong Kong in 1965 continued to be the 5 BTA
sectors in 1974. As for South Korea, there were only 4 BTA, namely,
Clothing, Footwear, Miscellaneous and Textiles, in 1965. In 1974,-
Electrical and Metal manufactures have joined the list of BTA sectors.
In that year, Hong Kong controlled 16% and South Korea 13% of the U.S.
Clothing market.
Table 4.12
Hong Kong Sector Intensities in U.S.A., 1974 and 1965
































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
Table 4.13
South Korea Sector Intensities in U.S.A., 1974 and 1965
































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
4.3.2 U.K. Market
For Hong Kong, Clothing and Footwear retained the top two positions
in 1974; and Miscellaneous has risen from 4th to 3rd while Textile lias
dropped from 3rd to 4th position. Not much change has taken place at
the lower level except that Food has dropped from 10th to the 12th and
Machinery, of which Hong Kong had no export to U.K. in 1965, now occupied
the 9th position in 1974. The other casualty was that Electric, though
it has no change in position, is no longer a BTA sector.
As for South Korea performance in U.K., a completely different
picture emerged over the years. In 1965, only 4 sector have exports to
U.K., and they were Textiles, Clothing, Machinery and Food, ranked in
that order. Textiles was the only BTA sector. In 1974, 10 sectors have
exports to U.K., the two exceptions were Furniture and Transport. Further,
Textiles has dropped from the 1st to 3rd position and is no longer a BTA
sector. Clothing has taken his place at the top and was the only BTA
sector in 1974.
Table 4.14
Hong Kong Sector Industries In U.K., 1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
Table 4.15
South Korea Sector Industries in U.K., 1974 and 1965
































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations
1965-1974.•
4.3,3 Germany Market
The Clothing industry continued to be the strongest Hong Kong
sector in Germany while Footwear has dropped from 2nd to 4th and
also out of the BTA sector lists. Electric has risen from 6th to
3rd while Furniture has dropped from 4th to 9th position. In 1965-
Machinery, Transport and Non-Metal had no exports to Germany, but in
1974 Transport was the only sector with no exports to Germany. After
Electric's fall, Clothing and Miscellaneous remained the only two
BTA sectors.
South Korea has done rather well in Germany. In 1965, 7 of the
12 sectors have no exports to Germany, while in 3.974, Furniture was
the only one. Miscellaneous, Transport and Footwear, three of the
sectors which have no exports in 1965, new occupied the 2nd, 3rd
and 5th positions and are also BTA sectors too. Textiles has fallen
from 1st to 4th and Clothing has taken its place at the top, rising
from 2.5 to 1. Machinery has fallen from 2.5 to 10 and Food 5th to
11th. The former has fallen out of the BTA too. All these drastic
changes are thus responsible for the low spearman coefficient.
Table 4.16
Hnnn Form Sprhnr Tni-pri.qi ps in fiprm.nv
1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
Table 4.17
South Korea Sector Intensities in Germany,
1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.~
4.3.4 Japan Market
Footwear was the strongest and Clothing second strongest sectors
for Hong Kong in Japan in 1965. In 1974, the position was reversed.
While Non-Metal was third in 1965, it has dropped to 5th position; Metal
has risen from 6th to 3rd and Miscellaneous remained 4th in both periiods.
In 1965, the 6 strongest sectors were BTA sectors; in 1974,
Electric, whose position remained locked at 7th, joined the 6 as the
7th BTA sector. The other positions remained practically the same except
that Transport still has no exports to Japan in 1974, while in 1965,
Footwear had no export too.
As for South Korea, many changes have taken place, most notably
Footwear. This sector has no export to Japan in 1965, but in 1974 it
was the strongest sector for South Korea in the Japan market, capturing
over 40% of the share. Due to the emergence of Footwear, the 3 strongest
sectors in 1965, i.e., Clothing, Textiles and Metal, all dropped by one
position into 2nd, 3rd and 4th place. Furniture, a sector with no export
in 1965, now in the 7th place and has also become a BTA sector. Food
has dropped from the 4th to the 10th position and out of the BTA list;
Machinery, which was 8th, was 11th in 1974.
Table 4=18
Hong Kong Sector Intensities in Japan
1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Rations,-
1965-1974.
Table 4.15
South Korea Sector Intensities .in Japar
1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
4.3.5 Sector Intensities in the Group Market
In the group market as a whole, Clothing and Miscellaneous have
remained the 2 strongest Hong Kong sectors. Electric has improved from
6th to 3rd while Textiles from 5th to 4th. Furniture has dropped from
4th to 5th and Footwear from 3rd to 6th, and both dropped from the BTA list.
As for South Korea, Footwear and Clothing remained the 2 strongest
sectors though Clothing has now taken the lead. The position for Mis¬
cellaneous and Textiles, occupying 3rd and 4th places in 1965 have also
been reversed. While Electric has risen from 7th to 5th position, and
become a BTA sector, Metal has dropped from 5th to 6th place, but remained
as the last BTA sector in 1974. Food has dropped from 6th to 9th place.
Table 4.20
Hong Kong Sector Intensities in the Group, 1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
Table 4,21
South Korea Sector Intensities in the Group,
1974 and 1965































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations,
1965-1974.
Table 4.22
Better- Th an- Ave rage .(BT A) Sectors for Hong Kong, By Area:
1974 and 1965
(1974)




















































Source: Derived from Table 4.12—4.21.
Table 4.2 3
Better Than--Average (BTA) Sectors for South Korea, By Area:
1974 and 1965
(1974)













































Source: Derived from Table 4.12—4.21.
Note 1.00
Table 4.22. and 4.2 3 above summarise the BTA sectors by area.
It appears that there were only 2 Hong Kong sectors which were BTA in al.
areas and they were Clothing and Miscellaneous. This was also the case
in 1965. As for Electric, Textiles, Furniture, Metal Manufactures,
they were BTA in 2 of the 4 areas in 1965, the same applies to 1974 too,
As for Professional, she was a BTA only in Japan in 1965, same again
happened in 1974.
As for South Korea, the only sector which was BTA in all area dn
1974 was Clothing, and in 1965, she was BTA in 3, the exception being
the U.K. market. On the other hand, the only sector that was BTA in a]
areas in 1965 was Textiles, and in 1974, she was BTA in 3, and the
exception being again the U.K. market. U.K. was thus the weakest area
for South Korea, just like Germany to Hong Kong. Footwear and Metal
were BTA in all except U.K. in 1974 while Miscellaneous was BTA in 2
of the 4 areas in 1974 as well as 1965.
Table 4.24
Sectors in which Hong Kong and South Korea were both BTA sectors, _3,974














(HK+ SK= 6) (HK+ SK= 7) (HK T SK= 5) f HK+ SK= 6) (HK r SK= 8)
Source: Derived from Table 4.12— 4.21.
Note: Total sectors in which either Hong Kong or South Korea was BTA.
Table 4.25
Sector in which Hong Kong and South Korea were both BTA sectors, 1965











(HK+SK= 7) (HK+SK =6) (HK+ SK= 6) (HK+SK= 6) (HK-!- SK- 8)
Source: Derived from Table 4.12—-4.21.
Note: Total sectors in which either Hong Kong or South Korea was BTA.
A comparison of BTA sectors for Hong Kong and South Korea by area
shows a high degree of competition. Tables 4.24-—4.25 show that in 1974
Hong Kong and South Korea were both BTA in the sectors of Clothing,
Textiles, Miscellaneous and Electric. In U.S.A. and in Japan, 4 and 5
of the BTA sectors overlap while in U.K. and Japan, it was Clothing that
overlaps. Except in U.K., their BTA sectors together comprised of half
or more than half of the 12 sectors. There was 5 in U.K. The implication
of the table is clear, competition between the same strong industries
of the two countries exist in all areas. Over the years the number of
BTA remained more or less the same and they comprised of the same industries
too.
Chapter V: C'onstant-Mar ket-Share Ana 1 ys 1 s of Export Expansion
5.1 Changes in Market Share Due to Various Factors r Theory
Constant-market-shares analysis is a popular method, if immensely
simplified, for examining a country's export growth. It basically
ascribes favorable or unfavorable export growth either to a country's
export structure or to its competitiveness. By contrast, a compre¬
hensive analysis of export growth could be quite complex— examining
factor availability, technology, market structure, demand patterns, and
government policies in the trading countries, its customers, and its
competitors.
In this chapter an attempt is made to decompose the growth of
exports of Hong Kong and South Korea in the Group Market during the
period 1965-1974 into several components. The basic analysis used here
was first proposed by H. Tyszynski and has been applied by several'
authors since then. The analysis has certain shortcomings, but it is
useful because it points out the major factors that affect the growth
of exports of a country.
In the following, all r ates of change refer to change between a
base period (t=0) and a later time (t=l). We define
r= rate of increase of Group Imports
1. H. Tyszynski, W7orld Trade in Manufactured Commodities, 1899-1950,
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, (Septeinber, 1951).
Other studies using this model are: A. Lamfalussy, The Hong Kong and
the Six: An Essay on Economic Growth in Western Europe (Homewood, 111:
R.D. Irwin, 1963). J.D. Richardson, Constant-Market-Shares Analysis
of Export Growth, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 1, (1971)
pp. 227-39.
rate of increase of j-area's imports
rate of increase of h-sector's imports
rate of increase of j-area's imports of h-sector
Now the change in one country's (say, Hong Kong) exports can be.
broken down into four terms:
It is easy to see that the sum of the four effects is:
Let us write this schematically as T= A+ B+ C+ S.
T is the total export increment from 1965 to 1974;
A is what the growth would have been had Hong Kong exports grown at
the same rate as Group Imports;
B is the effect of the differential commodity composition of increase
in Group trade on Hong Kong's exports, given the letter's 1965
commodity mix;
C is the effect of the differential area distribution of the increase
in Group trade on Hong Kong's exports, given the latter's 1965
geographical structure;
2. Derivation of the equation is in Appendix A(~5).
E is a residual: it is the difference between the actual growth of
Hong Kong exports and what growth would have been had Hong Kong
exports in every areasector market grown at the same rate as
.world exports to these markets. It is sometimes referred to
as the competitive effect.
If B 0, it means that exports are concentrated in commodities for
which demand is growing relatively slowly. If C 0, exports are going
primarily to relatively stagnant regions.
However, even if B 0, and C 0, Hong Kong might still increase
its share if E0 and it more than offsets (B+ C). E measures the
residual. As such, it is called the competitive effect. That is, all
growth not explained by area and sector changes of group demand is con¬
sidered to be growth due to competitive strength.
It is important to point out that both the commodity and the market
effect refer to a state of being (the structural concentration or high-
growth commodities and markets), not to any dynamic changes in the focus
country's export structure. Further, it should be observed that it was
arbitrary to compute the sector effect (B) first and the area effect (C)
as net of it. One could just as well write:
Schematically, let us write: T= A'+ C'+ B'+ E'
In this case, C' is the area effect and B' is the sector effect.
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Notice B r B' and C C, in general. Thus, there is an arbitrariness
in what we called sector or area effect. However, notice that:
So the combined sectorarea effect does not change— nor does
the competitive effect.
There are a variety of criticism of this model. The variables
and purport to measure changes in demand by importing
countries, and are implicitly assumed to be exogenous. However, they
may be determined by changes in performance of the exporters. For
example, if Hong Kong has particular vigorous growth in h-sector exports
this will cause to be large if Hong Kong provides a substantial
fraction of Group market h-imports. Thus, what appears as part of the
B term (a positive sector effect) should be considered due to competi¬
tive advantage.
Also, a number of criticisms have been raised by Van Doom Ocms,
• 3
who has constructed another model considerably more complicated. Ooms1s
major complaint is that structural relationships connecting particular
importers and exporters on the demand side and supply constraints which,
link together the variously directed flows from a given exporter must be
explicitly formulated for the model to accurately measure competitive
effects of share change. However, to make estimates using Ooms1s model
would require complex calculations beyond oud: scope here, so we will
stick to the original model as an approximation.
5.2 Changes in Market Share: Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis of Equation (1) has been carried out for
Hong Kong for the time period 1959-1974, and also for periods .1965-1969
and 1965-1974. The results are presented in Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
3. Van Doom Ooms, Models of Comparative Export. Performance, Yale
Econonu.cs Essays, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1967).
The areas of the world (j) referred to are U.S.A., U.K., Germany and
Japan as before and the commodities (h) are the 12 basic sectors and
subsectors of manufacturing listed in Chapter 2. However, most of the
analysis will pertain to the 1969-1974 period (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1
Analysis of Changing Market Share, 1969-1974
T A AT B BT C CT E ET
Hong Kong 1459471 1720258 117.9% 416922 28.6% -1411996 -9.7% -535714 -36.7%
South Korea 1938284 482682 24.9% 105194 5.4% 446334 23.0% 904074 46.6%
Source: Derived from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United
Nations, 1969-1974.
Table 5.2
Analvsis of Chanaina Market Share, 1965-1974
T A AT B BT C CT E ET
Hong Kong 2057426 1643164 80% 736179 35.8% -121013 -5.9% -200902 -9.8%
South Korea 2186243 203671 9.3% 12657 0.6% 188320 8.6% 1781592 81.5%
Source: Derived from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United
Nations, 1965-1974.
Table 5.3
Analysis of Changing Market Share, 1965-1969
T A AT B BT C CT S ETA
Hong Kong 597955 332728 55.6% 139081 23.3% 16604 2.8% 109543 18.3%
South Korea 247959 41242 16.6% -1695 -0.7% 18084 7.3% 190329 76.8%
Source: Derived from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United
Nations, 1965-1969.
The performance of the two countries are quite different according
to the Constant-Market Share model analysis„ As Table 5.1 indicates that
it is the growth effect which made the biggest contribution for Hong Kong
Sxport increase; but for South Korea the contribution was only 25%. The
world trade expansion effect is a result of good market net work in which
Hong Kong has been maintaining with the Group. This effect has increased
in the second period (1969-1.974). On the other hand, the competitive
effect shows that it was +47% responsible for South Korea export .increase
but -36.7% responsible for Hong Kong export increase. The implication
of these two figures is that while South Korea exports become more com¬
petitive over the years, Hong Kong export became less competitive.
Comparing the three tables reveal that, between 1965-1969, Hong Kong
export were compeitive, but became very uncompetitive between 1969-1974,
and moderately uncompetitive over the whole period. This coincided nicely
with Hong Kong export performance in the Group market, i.e., during 1965-
1969, Hong Kong has a share increase, and during 1969-1974, Hong Kong had
a share decline.
There is also an adverse area effect for Kong Kong during the 1969-
1974 period. The same applied to the whole period 1965-1974. These
negative contributions imply that demand grew less than proportionately
in those markets to which Hong Kong goods were mainly concentrated during
1969-1974 period and over the whole period as well. In this respect
Hong Kong's export pattern was quite compatible to Taiwan's experience
because from 1962 to 1972 the market distribution effect for Taiwan was
4
-3.5%. Further more, while the competitive effect was 82.5% responsible
4. The four effect for Taiwan for the period 1962-1972 are 24.1%, -3.1%,
-3.5% and 82.5% respectively. Computed from K.S. Liang, Exports and
Employment in Taiwan (1975) (mimeographed).
for Taiwan export increase during the 1962-1972 period, the figure for
South Korea was 81.5% during 1965-1974. The significance of the data
was that while South Korea and Taiwan, two principal competitors of
Hong Kong, became more competitive over time, Hong Kong has become less
competitive.
In terms of commodity composition effect in Table 5.1, Kong Kong
was better off than South Korea. This means that South Korea has a
commodity composition which has experienced slow growth in trend. However
as for the areasector effect in total, South Korea is better than Hong
Kong.
Table 5.2 indicates that, for the period as a whole, Hong Kong has
small but negative area and competitive effect while South Korea has a
very large but positive competitive effect. A sector-by-sector analysis
will be given later in this chapter.
As for commodity composition, Hong Kong has a higher commodity
composition effect than South Korea in both period, and also for the
period as a whole. The higher commodity composition effect reflects the
high speed with which Hong Kong economy has adjusted itself to changes
in world demand. High degree of flexibility is indeed one of the most
5
notable features of the Hong Kong economy. However, the difference in
the commodity composition effect between the two countries has narrowed
tremendously during the latter period. This means that South Korea has
become more and Hong Kong less flexible than before, even though Hong
Kong still maintains a lead. This surely reflects that the South Korea
economy is maturing.
5. Of James Fdedel, The Industrialisation of Hong Kong, Kieler Studies
124 (Tubinger: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974), p. 23.
The only case where South Korea received a negative sector effect
is during the early period. The effect was a negligible 0.7%. The
implication of this is that during the period 1965-1969, the South Korea
industries were not flexible enough to cater for changes in world demand.
However, this situation was rectified in the later period with a positive
5.4% sector effect.
Tahle 5.3 shows Hong Kong and South Korea performance in the early
period. During this period, it will be recalled, Hong Kong scored share
gain in the Group market. As Table 5.3 indicates, Hong Kong scored
positive gain in all 4 effects. There was a 18.3% improvement in com¬
petitiveness, as compared to a negative 36.7% in the second period.
There was also a positive area effect of 2.8% as compared to a negative
9.7% area effect in the latter period.
The strength of Hong Kong sectorarea bundle and South Korea's
relative weakness in the 1965-1969 period is indicated by the large (26%
sectorarea effect for Hong Kong and the small (6.6%) sectorarea effect
for South Korea. The Hong Kong bundle got weaker (18.9%) and the South
Korea stronger (28.4%) in the 1969-1974 period when the positive area
effect turned negative for Hong Kong and the negative sector effect
turned positive for South Korea.
With South Korea competing with Hong Kong in every market, and if
Hong Kong economy is going to maintain its present level of high export
expansion and economic growth, not only should new products be produced
and new markets be explored, but also more sophisticated production
techniques and industrial management should be introduced, so that both
its labor productivity and capital efficiency can be increased.
Table 5.4 to 5.9 give the sector performance of Hong Kong and
South Korea in the first period (1965-1969), the second period (1959-
1974), and the whole period. Table 5.4 shows that of the 12 Hong Kong
basic industries under consideration, 9 of them have negative competitive
effects and 7 of them scored negative area effects. This implies that
three quarter of the Hong Kong industrial exports have become less
competitive in the second period. They were Machinery, Electric, and
Professional. The negative area effect means that the area shift of
demand has turned unfavorably for 7 of the 12 Hong Kong basic industries.
As for South Korea, (Table-5.5) 11 of the 12 industries scored positive
competitive effect in the same period. The exception was Clothing.
Even though that 5 of the 12 South Korea industries scored negative area'
effect in the second period, none of them exceeded -8%.
As for.the first period (Table 5.6 and 5.7), 9 of the 12 Kong Kong
industries scored positive competitive effect, the exceptions were Textiles,
Machinery and Transport. There were 2 South Korea industries which scored
negative competitive effects, and they were Non-Metal and Footwear.
As can be recalled, during the first period, both countries scored share
gains in the Group and they are reflected by the general improvement of
competitiveness of the two countries.
As for the period as a whole (Table 5.8 and 5.9), South Korea has
increased her industrial competitiveness in all industries while 7 of
the 12 Hong Kong industries have became less competitive overtime. The
following six tables show the changes in Hong Kong and South Korea's
exports to the Group market by Commodity Classes in three different
periods.
Tafl p 6.4
Analvsis of Chancres in Hona Kona's Exoorts to the GrouD Market hv rnmmnriii-v Classes: 1969-1974
12 Industries only







































1. Due to increase
in world trade
2. Due to differen¬
tial commodity
composition
3. Due to differen¬
tial market
distribution
4. Due to increase
competitiveness
1459471 16946 107247 11705 44055 21376 306896 418 15580 700633 45259 183650
1720258 33455 140794 14634 32761
(117.9) (197.4) (131.3) (125.0) (74.4)
416922 -5828 -18167 -2927 13708
(28.6) (-34.4) (-16.9) (-25.0) (31.2)
-141996 18824 -9819 3106 722
(-9.7) (111-7) (-9.2) (26.5) (1.6)
-535714 -29506 -5562 -3108 -3166
(-36.7) (-174.1) (-5.2) (-26.6) (-7.2)
543 224637 8891 12013 672519 48448
(2.5) (73.2) (2127) (77.10) (96.0) (849.1)
0 82608 -1402 6898 282024 9690
(0) (26.9) (-96.2) (44.3) (40.3) (169.8)
-4 -33486 -226 562 -89390 11837
-n rm tin qi i i a am (-17 m
20837 33137 -7845 -3892 -164519 -64269









Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1969-1974, they do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
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Table 5.5
Analysis of Changes in South Korea's Exports to the Group Market by Commodity Classes: 1969-1974
12 Industries only













1. Due to increase
in world trade
2. Due to differen¬
tial commodity
composition
3. Due to differen¬
tial market
distribution
4. Due to increase
competitiveness
311408 39006 20888 615 4029 7158 28994 802 742 136242 8635 1166 63141
2249692 226051 253181 29489 87004 57573 376251 36350 12023 751956 146250 29406 244158
1938284 187045 232293 28884 82975 50415 347257 35548 11281 615714 137615 28240 181017
482682 60459 32376 938 6245 11095 44941 1243 1150 211175 13384 1807 97869
(24.9) (32.3) (13.9) (3.2) (7.5) (22.0) (12.9) (3.5) (10.2) (34.3) (9.7) (6.4) (54.1)
105194 -10532 -4178 -188 2619 0 16527 -56 660 88557 2677 268 8840
(5.4) (-5.6) (-1.8) (-0.7) (3.2) (0) (4.8) (-0.2) (5.9) (14.4) (1.9) (0.9) (4.9)
446334 35997 11458 32 -743 -249 -8389 377 2390 423659 -4193 98 -14103
(23.0) (19.2) (4.9) (0.1) (-0.9) (-0.5) (-2.4) (1.1) (21.2) (68.8) (-3.0) (0.3) (-7.8)
904074 101120 192636 28102 74854 39569 294179 33984 7081 -107677 125747 26067 88412
(46.6) (54.1) (82.9) (97.3) (90.2) (78.5) (84.7) (95.6) (62.8) (-17.5) (91.4) (92.3) (48.8)
Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
0
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1969-1974, they do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
T'aVII c R C
Analvsis of Chancres in Hona Kona's Exoorts to the Groun Market bv Commoditv Classes: 1965-196:
12 Industries nnlv
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in world trade
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Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Vpprhnnk of Tntprnatinnal Trade Statistics. United Nations.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1965-1969, they do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
TahT p 5_'
Analysis of Changes in South Korea's Exports to the Group Market by Commodity Classes: 1965-1969
12 Industries onlv
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tial market
distribution









































































































































Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1965-1969, tY.ey do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
88.0 84.5
Table 5.8
Analysis of Changes in Hong Kong's Exports to the Group Market by Commodity Classes: 1965-1974
12 Industries only













1. Due to increase
in world trade
2. Due to differen¬
tial commodity
composition
3. Due to differen¬
tial market
distribution

















































































































































Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1965-1974, they do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Thl S. 9
Analysis of Chanqes in South Korea's Exports to the Group Market by Commodity Classes: 1965-1974
12 Industries only
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distribution

















































































































































Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total changes from 1965-1974, they do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
5.3 Changes in Market Share: Analysis by Sector and_ Are a
An analog to Equation (1) can be constructed for each sector and
each area market. For a sector h we can write:
(3)
Schematically Here C is the area effect of
trade in a xarticular sector. The following table shows the results
of carrying out an analysis for Hong Kong and South Korea for the 1969-
1974 period.
Table 5.10
Analysis of Share of Change by Sector, 1969-1974
Sector











































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1969-74
6 Note that the competitive effects. E provide a decomposition of the
aggregate competitive effect (from Equation (1) above) in the following
sense:= E (This is easily seen by summing Equation (3) over all
sectors h, and comparing the resultant equation to Equation (1).)
In 9 of the sectors the competitive effect is negative for Hong
Kong, and in 7 of them, the area effect is negative. None of the sectors
has positive effect in both cases, but in Textiles, Transport and
Miscellaneous both effects are negative. In order to compare the
influence of the area effect (C) and the competitive effect(£) in affect-
ing Hong Kong share decline, we have computed the percentage of the
commodity effect out of the absolute sum of the two effects, i.e.
Table 5.10 shows that, in every sector except Textiles, and in Non-Metal
and Electric of which the two effects were more or less the same, the
competitive effect was more responsible than the area effect for the
decline in Hong Kong shares.
As for South Korea, every sector except Clothing achieved a positive
competitive effect, and in 5 of the 12 sectors there was a negative area
effect. However, there was no sector that has negative effects in both
cases.
Table 5.11
Hong Kong Sector Strength in 1974 Ranked Against Degree of










































Source: Derived from Table 5.10 and 4.1.
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Table 5.12
South Korea Sector strength in 1974 Ranked Against Degree of












































Source: Derived from Table 5.10 and 4.1.
Table 5.11 above ranks Hong Kong sectors by Group strength in 1974
against their ranking by the degree to which the competitive effect was
responsible for share loss as compared to the area effect. If strong
Hong Kong sectors were strong competitively, one would expect a high
positive correlation. However, the correlation is ys~ 30, which is
not significant. The Hong Kong BTA sectors faired 1,2,5,9 in the com¬
petitive rankincr. Over 60% of the share loss in Clothing ana 88-s m
Miscellaneous, two of the largest Hong Kong export industries, was due
to the competitive effect.
As for South Korea 7 of the 12 area effects were rositive and
all except one competitive effects were positive and they far outweighted
the negligible area effect. In the only sector in which South Korea lost
share- Clothing- the competitive effect was 20% responsible. In 9 of
the 12 industries, the area effect is less than 15% responsible for the
share increase.
Contrary to the Spearman coefficient for Kong Kong, the correlation
between sector strength and the competitive effect, as presented in Table
5.12, is yc= 0.55, which is significant at 10% level. This means that
strong South Korea sectors were strong competitively. The South Korea
BTA faired 1,4,5,6,7,9 in the competitive ranting.
On the whole, the 1965-1969 period was quite different from the
1969-1974 period. Table 5.13 below shows the results of a sector analysis
of share change for Hong Kong and South Korea for 1965-1969. As for Kong
Kong, there were 3 sectors which have negative area effects. They were
Textiles, Clothing and Footwear. While the former one has a very large-
negative competitive effect, the latter two have large negative area effects.
As for South Korea, Machinery was the only industry which has a
negative area effect, but it was less than 1%. There were also two
industries which have negative competitive effects and they were Non-
Metal and Footwear. The negative competitive effects were more than
65% in both cases.
Table 5.13
Analysis of Share Change by Sector, 1965-1969
Sector











































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations, 1965-
1974.
Note: No export in 1965.
A similar analysis can be carried out to discover the effect of
of sector demand changes within each area as opposed to competitive
effects to account for share changes by area. Thus we have:
(4)
Table 5.14 below presents the results of such analysis for the
1969-1974 period. The patterns for both countries are unambiguous.
Hong Kong has positive sector effects in all areas, and adverse com
petitive effects in all areas too. Except for U.S.A., the adverse
competitive effects was in the range of 30-50%. As for U.S.A., Hong Kong
has an adverse competitive effect of 96!
As for South Korea, she has a negligible 1.7% negative sector
effect in the U.S.A. market and positive sector effect in three other
areas. She also has positive competitive effects in all areas. Excep
for Japan, South Korea's traditional market, the competitive effects
for the other three areas were as high as 97%.
Table 5.14















Derived from commodity Trade Statistes, United Natons, 1969
1974.
The picture is thus obvious and consistent with our previous
findings. As pointed out before, Hong Kong has been losing share in
the U.S.A. market since 1969 and Table 5.14 above shows that it is
because Hong Kong exports were losing their competitiveness in the
markets. On the other hand, South Korea's performance in her traditions]
market, i.e., Japan, is not as satisfactory as the other three markets
because her exports have only a moderate but positive competitive effect.
The biggest contrast appears in the U.S.A. market. While Hong Kong
suffered a negative competitive effect of 96% in this market,- South
Korea has a 98.3% positive competitive effect. Thus, it may be concluded
that South Korea is responsible for Hong Kong share loss in the U.S.A.
market.
Chapter VI: The Comparative Advantage approach to the determination
of the pattern of trade.
Previous chapters have analysed the patterns of trade of Hong
Kong and South Korea without touch upon the price variable. Price,
we mean pre-trade prices, is one of the most important factors that
determines the pattern of trade in general, and the quantities and
values of exports of a country in particular. It is rather unfor¬
tunate that pre-trade prices cannot be observed, and various sugges¬
tions have been made to get round this difficulty.
The Ricardian Theory
Ricardo is generally credited with having been the first econo¬
mist to recognise the importance of differences in relative, or, as
he called it, comparative costs as the basis for international trade.
The theory of comparative advantage maintains that
if trade is left free each country in the long run
tends to specialise in the production of and to ex¬
port those commodities in whose production it enjoys
a comparative advantage in terms of real costs, and
to obtain by importation those commodities which
could be produced at home only at a comparative dis¬
advantage in terms of real cost, and that each speciali-
sation is to the mutual advantage of the countries
2
participating in it.
1. Heller, H.R. International Trade: Theory and Empirical Evidence,
Prentice-Hall. Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, p.34.
2. Viner, J. Studies in the Theory of International Trade, Reprints
of Economic Classics, Augustus M.Keliey, Publisher, New York,1965.
p.438.
The theory thus concerns net only with gains from trade but also
with the determination of the pattern of trade, i.e. the determination
of (traded) commodities into exports and imports in a static analytical
framework. According to Viner's interpretation, the real costs
are expressed as a rule in terms of quantities of labor-time, but with
the implication, as throughout the classical theory of value, that
these quantity of labor-time correspond in the relative amount within
3
each country to quantities of subjective costs.
The Ricardian theory provided positive justification for gains
attributable to trade and also attempted to isolate the crucial vari¬
ables which can be used to explain the patterns of trade in the 'laissez
faire' situation. Determination of the pattern is demonstrated by the
4
England-Portugal example in Ricardo's Principles.
The model is composed of two countries, two commodities and one
factor-labor. Constant returns to scale are assumed and the pre-tra.de
commodity price ratio is a function exclusively of the output-factor
ratios contained the production functions. The combination of a single
factor with constant returns to scale insures that neither demand nor
the level of factor supply makes any difference to the equilibrium
commodity price ratio in a closed economy. It is based on these strict
3. Viner J. ibid
4. Ricardo D. On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation
(London: John Murray), 1817, in The Works and Correspondence of
David Ricardo, Vol.1, ed. by Piero Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 1951. p.76-77.
find stringent assumptions that Ricardo believed that the problem of
pre-trade prices can be got over with.
Let L.. and L„ be the amounts of labor available in Country 1 and] 2
Country 2 respectively, and lx. and ly. be the amount of labor require.:
to produce one unit of X and one unit of Y respectively in Country i
( i= 1,2). Let x. and y. denote the output of X and Y respectivelyi
in country i( i= 1,2), and let Lx.. and lym be the amount of labor
input into the X and Y industry respectively in Country i( i- 1,2).
Then the production function for each good in Country i is simply.
and
where : productivity of labor in industry X and
- productivity of labor in industry Y.
The amounts of the goods produced in each country are cf course
constrained by the'total labor endowment of the country. In other
words,
and
Since, in genera]., and the production
functions for the same good are not the same in both countries. This
is in contrast to the assumption of the Heckscher-Ohlin model that the
production functions for the same good are identical in both countries.
Let us suppose that country 1 (2) has a comparative advantage
in the production of X (Y), then
It implies that commodity X will be cheaper and commodity Y dearer
in Country 1 than in Country 2. Consequently, Country 1 will export
commodity X and import commodity Y, in accordance with the Ricardian
theory. It is assumed, of course, that Ix. 0 and ly. 0( i= 1,2).i i
The equivalence of the above shows what Viner said:
1 It is unessential whether cost ratios which are
compared are the ratios between the costs of
producing different commodities within the same
countries or ratios between the costs of pro¬
ducing the same commodities in different coun-
6tries.
The model can also be expressed in productivity terms. Again
assuming that Country 1 has a comparative advantage in the production of
X, then
5. Takayama, A. International Trade: An approach to the Theory, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc. P.114-115.
6. Viner J. op. cit. p.438-439.
or equivealently.
(1)
The most frequently interpretation for the purpose of testing the
classical porposition has been in terms of factor productivities as
expressed in (1). It is thus the comparative labor productivities which
stand in as proxy for pre-trade price ratio that determines trade patterns.
The rationale behind this intepretation is intuitively plausible. Since
there is a direct relationship between labor productivities and prices
( labor being the only factor of production), and, further, since ex¬




and Country 1 will export X and import Y.
These prices, defined as equal to costs, can be written in terras
of three component factors:
P.= 1/a.. W./'L.. TC/.W.i i i i j i
where 1ay-S the Icibor: output ratio, W is the wage bill( so that
W.L. is the wage rate), L. is labor and TC. is the total cost.
ii l i
The Classical theory focuses entirely on a_. and ignores the other
two factors on the grounds that they are either insignificant, or they•
are identical between countries. Substituting 1a. for P. in thei i
above price comparision gives us the condition
we thus arrive at the same condition as (1).
(2)
However, after the original formulation of the Classical hypothesis
based on productivity differentials, it has subsequently been realised
that inter-country differences in the wage structure may compensate for
productivity differentials; a country possessing a relative productivity
advantage in a particular industry may still import the commodity in
question if it paid relatively higher wages andor had higher capital
7
costs per unit of output in that industry.
7. Viner J. ibid., p.493-512
Still, the defenders of Classical theory- among others,
Taussig- expressed the opinion that the latter factors are not suf¬
ficiently important to warrant significant changes in the trade pat-
8
tern as determined by relative differences in productivities. More¬
over, whether wage differentials is important or not can only be




Country 1 and 2,
.m, and
n.
8. Taussig F. International Trade,( New York: Macmillan, 192),
p.43-68.
This is, in fact, a statement of the Ricardian hypothesis
which is in terms of comparative unit labor costs and not labor
productivity. It is the hypothesis which is to be found in most of
9
the empirical literature.
6.2 Survey of Empirical findings
From the viewpoint of propositions concerning the patterns
of trade, the Ricardian model has been adapted to formulate testable
hypotheses. The latter have also been subjected to empirical veri¬
fication in a series of excellent papers. For example, MacDougall
published a paper under the title British and American Exports:
10
A Study Suggested by the Theory of Comparative Costs in 1951. In
his pioneer paper, he applied the Ricardian theory to United Kingdom
and U.S.A. and concluded that the labor theory of value, crude as
it is, does help to provide some explanation of British and American
export trade in an imperfect world.
9. Bhagwati, J. The Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey,
Economic Journal (March 1964).
10. MacDougall, D. British and American Exports: A Study Suggested
by the Theory of Comparative Costs, Economic
Journal (December 1951).
Other attempts were also made by Robert Stern and Bela Balassa,
Both worked with the data for the United Kingdom and U.S.A. The findings
of these empirical studies were summarised by Bhagwati in a survey article
published in the Economic Journal in 1964. It is reproduced below.
Table 6.1
The results of MacDougall, Steam and Balassa
a
























































x and y refer to the logarithms of the United States: United Kingdom
export ratio and United States: United Kingdom labour productivity
ratio respectively. x and y in the last regression refer to the
ratios themselves. MacDougall does not state his 1937 regression
equation.
The productivity data refer to 1950 and the source is the same as that
used by MacDougall and Stern. However, the export data refer to values
instead of quantities and are for 1951 instead of 1950.
11. Bhagwati, J. op. cit.
Balassa in his paper An Empirical Demonstration of Classical
12
Cost Theory also tested the relation between exports and pro¬
ductivity and wages, exports and unit costs. The results of his regre
sion equations are given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2









Note: x, y, w and c refer to relative exports, productivities, wage
rates and unit labor costs of United States and United Kingdom
respectively.
12. Balassa, B. An Empirical Demonstration of Classical Comparative
Cost Theory, Review of Economics and Statistics
(August 1963)
13
The studies by Stern and Balassa for the postwar period con¬
firm and amplify the conclusion reached in the pioneer effect by
MacDougall. They found that other factors, such as capital costs per
unit of output and the like, did not influence the export performance
of the countries to any significant extent. Their results confirmed
MacDougall's findings of a high correlation between relative pro¬
ductivities of labor and export shares.
6.3 The Hypotheses and Empirical Results
Following the Ricardian approach, we would like to inves¬
tigate the following hypotheses:
is positively correlated with
is negatively correlated with
is negatively correlated with
where and are the values of exports of Countries 1 and 2;
13. Stern, R. British and American Productivity and Comparative





are the outputlabor ratios of Countries 1 and 2;
are the wage rates of Countries 1 and 2; and
are the unit labor costs of Countries 1 and 2.




where is the relative exports of Hong Kong and South Korea
Basic industries to the Group market in 1973, and RP. is the relative
productivity of Hong Kong and South Korea industry( here product¬
ivity is defined as Gross Outputpersons employed). We expect a
positive relation to exist between relative exports and relative
productivity. The results of the regression are shown below:
(12)
The results show that the relative productivity variable is
significant only at 20% level and the equation does not give a good
fit. The sign, however, is positive as expected.
14. The figures in parenthesis are t-values.
Now we define productivity as Value Addedpersons employee
and re-run the equation again and the results are shown below:
. (13)
Defining productivity as value addedpersons employed worsens
the results in all aspects. The next step we did was to change the






Equation 14 shows that, by turning Equation 11 into log form,
a better result can be obtained. The variable RP. is now signif¬
icant at 10% level. The equation also shows a better fit, but the
2
R is still low. Equation 15 also shows a general improvement over
Equation 13, but the variable RIV is still insignificant and the
2
R too low.
Since the last four equations have shown that there is only
a small correlation between relative exports and relative product-
ivity, whatsoever defined, so we tested the relationship between
relative exports and relative wage rates. But the results( given
in the Appendix) are not only insignificant but also has the wrong
signs.
Another simple test we carried out is to test the hypothesis
L
that relative exports is a function of unit lanor cost. Cur assump-
tion here is that the higher the relati.ve unit labor cost, the higher
the relative export prices, hence lower relative exports. We thus
expect a negative relation to exist between the relative export
variable and the relative unit albor cost variable. The results of
the regression, and also in in log form, are show below:
(3.3790) (1.5880)
(1.2487) (1.7982)
The results show that relative unit labor cost as a variable
in determining relative export value is significant at 2C-o levej, ana
at 10% level if in log form. The sign is also righu- a negative
(16)
(17)
relation exists between relative exports and relative unit labor
costs. However, it is rather unfortunate that both regressions did
not give good fit. The low R indicates that only 20% of the varia¬
tions can be explained by the variable RCh.
The last thing we did for this section is to run a multiple
regression with relative productivities, relative wage rates, and
relative unit labor costs as explanatory variables. The dependent
variable remains the same, i.e. relative export values. The regres¬
sions were run four times,-using both definitions of productivities,
and also in their log forms. But most of the equations did not yield
good results. The equation which has the correct signs for all the
coefficients is given below:
2
Yet the coefficients are not significant and the R is also
very low. Thus, to conclude this section, we can say that the vari¬
able RC appears to be somewhat a significant variable in determining
the relative exports of the two countries. The higher the relative
unit labor costs, the lower will be the relative export value.
The above discussion and tests have also shown that the Ricardian
approach to the determination of Hong Kong and South Korea exports
RX.= 1.5834+ 0.2368RP.- 0.0807 RW.- 0.3119 RC (18)
gi l 11
(0.7617) (0.4022) (0.1126) (0.4496)
R= 0.22
to the Group market is rather weak and did not produce good results.
The only variable that is somewhat significant is the unit labor cost,
which has also the right sign. However, throughout the above discus-
sion and tests, the dependent variable is the relative exports of
Hong KongSouth Korea to the four markets as a Group, this undoubtedly
blurs the export patterns of Hong Kong and South Korea exports to
individual countries. In order to show whether the Ricardian approach
to the determination of Hong KongSouth Korea exports to individual
country is valid or not, we test all the variables again, but with the
dependent variable change to relative exports of Hong KongSouth Korea
to each country.
Again the results are in line with the Group Market equations.
Of the three independent variables, only RC is significant and has
the right sigh. The following table lists all the regressions that
























The other equations are not very significant, some variables
2
have the wrong signs and the R are very low and many of the coef¬
ficients are not significant. The results are produced in the Appendix
A point needs to be mentioned is that variable RW.. Most of the
i
signs for this variable are positive. This of course is not in line
15
with out hypothesis. However, as Balassa pointed out that there
is some- although largely inconclusive- evidence that higher re-
16
lative wages might be associated with higher export shares. If
this were so, a possible explanation would be that greater success in
exportation may lead to higher wages. This means that the relationship
between wages and export shares is by no mean uni-directional; while
lower wages could conceivably lead to higher export shares, higher
export shares might also make possible paying higher wages. It is,
however, rather unfortunate that the sign for the variable RVM is not
consistent throughout our tests and therefore cannot be advanced as
a variable determining relative export shares.
It can therefore be concluded that, in general, the Ricardian
approach does not explain much regarding the relative export perfor¬
mance of Hong Kong and South Korea.
15. Balassa, B. op. cit.
16. See also I.B.Kravis, Wages and Foreign Trade, Review of Economics
and Statistics, XXXVIII (February 1956), p.30
6.4 The Revealed Comparative Advantage Analysis
The consideration of inter-country differences in the
efficiency of individual industries underlies the explanation given
by the Classical Theory of Comparative Advantage when data on labor
have been used as a proxy for efficiency- However, the lack of con¬
sideration given to inter-industry differences in capital costs and
non-price factors reduce the usefulness of the Classical doctrine.
They are almost certain to be responsible for the negative results
2
and low R of the regressions in the previous sections.
Non-price variables in the form of quality, goodwill, ser¬
vicing, repair facilities and traditional ties etc. have often suf¬
fered neglect in theoretical discussions and in empirical studies
because they are not easily quantifiable. Even though they all bear
influences on the pattern of international trade among the indus¬
trial countries, they are seldom used as explanatory variables in
regression analysis. In any case, cost and price considerations will
not be sufficient to explain the widespread use of Hong Kong Textiles
in the U.S.A., and more generally, a complete explanation of com¬
parative advantage could not leave out of consideration the non-price
variables.
In view of the difficulties of quantifying non-price variables,
a suggestion has been made by Balassa in explaning the pattern of
trade. According to Balasss
18
it is not necessary to explicitly take
account of all influences that determine
comparative advantage rather iu appears
sufficient to provide information on
'revealed' comparative advantage
It is suggested that revealed comparative advantage can be
indicated by the trade performance of individual countries .in regard
to manufacturing products, in the sense that commodity pattern of
trade reflects relative costs as well as differences in non-price
factors.
Following Balassa's approach, our inquiry again limits to the
twelve Basic industries exported by Hong Kong and South Korea to the
Group Market because they provi.de the lion's share in trade between
the Group Market and the two countries concerned. The export perfor¬
mance of individual industries of Hong Kong or South Korea can be
evaluated by (a) comparing the relative share of Hong Kong or South
Korea in the Group imports of individual industries, and (b) indica¬
ting changes in relative share over time. In both instances, the data
have been made comparable through appropriate normalisation. Y:q
accomplished this by dividing Hong Kong's share in the exports of a
given commodity by its share in the imports of manufactured goods of
the Group Market, and expressed the result in index number form. Thus,
18. Balassa, B. Trade Liberalisation and 'Revealed' Comparative
Advantage, The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,
(May 1965).
for a given export commodity by Hong Kong, an index number of
100+x, x 0 will mean that Hong Kong shaire in this commodity's
exports is x% higher than its share in the total exports of manu¬
factured goods to the Group Market. Similar calculations have also
been made for changes in shares between in two three-year periods
(1965-67 and 1972-74) that have been chosen as representative of the
mid-sixties and the early seventies.
Correspondingly, we have calcualted (1) the relative share of
Country i's exports of commodity j in the years 1965-67, (2) the re¬
lative share of Country i's export of commodity j in 1972-74, and.
(3) the ratio of the relative share of Country i's exports of commod¬
ity j in the second period to that in the first period. In all cases,
the expression relative share refers to the ratio of the share of
Country i in the exports of commodity j to the Group to the share of








19. Explanation of symbols:
X= exports to the Group,
M= imports by the Group Country
x= relative share of exports
Superscripts: 0= average for years 1965-67; 1= 1972-74
Subscripts: i= country i
j= product j
n= 4 countries taken together
t= total
Equations 1 and 2 indicate the relative shares observed in
two different periods and equation 3 is the relative growth rate.
The combination of equations 2 and 3, i.e. equation 4, means that
the continuation of past trends in relative shares would be pro¬
jected in the form of geometric progression to the future. We have
decided against using this equation to evaluate relative advantages
in the exportation of manufactured goods. Instead, we assume that
while past trends in relative shares can be expected to continue,
this will take place at a declining pace as compared to the past.
Equation 5, which shows exactly this, is the arithmetic average of
equation 2 and 4. The following table shows the normalised export
performance indices of Hong Kong and South Korea .CALCULMECN Frist Bity
Table 6.4
Indices of Export Performance











































































Source: Derived from Commodity Trade Statistics,_ UN, 1965-74
and Yearbook of INternational Trade Statistics, UN, 1965-74.
Export performance indices provide an indication of relative
advantages (and disadvantages) for individual countries but the
7
dispersion of these indices- representing the markedness of com¬
parative advantages- is likely to differ from country tc country.
In general, one would expect that large countries would produce a
great variety of commodities and hence show relatively small differ¬
ences in export performance indices. Further, large countries usually
possess a more balanced resource endowments and will have a home mar¬
ket sufficiently wide to permit the production of most industrial
products.
On the contrary, small countries would produce a large differ¬
ences in export performance indices because they lack resource endow-
ments on the one hand, and a large home market on the other. Con¬
sequently, they would concentrate on a few exportable commodities.
This case applies to both Hong Kong and South Korea and we thus expect
large differences in export performance indices.
These expectations are by and large confirmed by empirical
evidence. We found that standard deviations of export, performance
indices are quite large for Hong Kong and South Korea, the former
being 94.6 and the latter 151.7. The following table compares the
standard deviations of export performance indices of Hong Kong and
South Korea and six other countries.
Table 65


















The standard deviations for Hong Kong and South Korea were
derived from Table 6.4 while the others were reproduced from
20
Balassa's paper. The eight standard deviations in the above
table are not actually comparable because the first six referred
to the 1953-62 period while the last two referred to 1965-74
period. Also the number of commdoities covered are different. In
Balassa's paper, 74 categories were distinguished while we only
20. Balassa, B. op. cit.
covered 12 categories. Nevertheless, the figures should give us
some indications that in small economies like Hong Kong and South
Korea, large standard deviations of performance indices are to be
expected.
As compared to the Group Countries, Table 6.4 reveals that
Hong Kong appears to have relative advantages in Textiles, Clothings,
Eclectric, and Miscellaneous. On the other hand, she is at a dis¬
advantage in the production of Food, Footwear, Non-metal, Metal
Manufactures, Machinery, Transport, Furniture and Professional.
South Korea seems to fair better. She has comparative advan¬
tages in Clothings, Footwear, Furniture, Textiles, Electric as well
as Miscellaneous and disadvantages in the rest of the 6 products.
Examining the performance indices reveals that, for Hong Kong,
there are only 3 out of 12 products that fell inside the 80 to 120
range; as for South Korea, none of them fell within this range. This
phenomenon indicates that for practically all the industries of both
countries, they either reveal excessive comparative advantages or
disadvantages. This of course complements the large standard
deviations of Table 6.Se
The export performance indices also reveal that, as far as
trade between Hong Kong and the Group is concerned, Hong Kong seems
to have comparative advantage in labour-intensive sectors. The four
sectors of which Hong Kong has comparative advantages, all require
massive amount of labor inputs. More or less the same applies to South
Korea.
The reader should have noted that the commodities that these two
countries have comparative advantages are standardised and non-stan¬
dardised and non-durable consumer goods requiring only simple tech¬
nology. This is hardly surprising since, in the case of homogeneous
products, natural product differentiation plays a relatively small
role and trade patterns are largely determined by intercountry dif¬
ferences in relative costs, especially labor costs.
Despite the observed differences between indices of export
performance, the ranking of products at the top and at the bottom of
the list is reasonable clear for the two countries under consideration.
Both countries appear to have relative advantages with respect to
Clothings, Electric and Textiles, all labor intensive products. Both
countries have relative disadvantages( or less comparative advan-
tange) in Transport, Food, Non-metal, and Machinery, all requiring
capital, or a particular kind of resource or technology. The Spear¬
man coefficient of 0.67 shows that the rank correlation of the two
countries is significant at 5% level.
South Korea also have relative advantages in Furniture and
Footwear while Hong Kong has disadvantages in these two industries.
This may reflect the lack of resources in wood and rubber, the two
basic inputs for these two industries.
We have set out to examine the revealed comparative advantage
of Hong Kong and South. Korea exports of 12 manufactured goods to the
Group Market by utilizing available, information in their export shares
in regard to these 12 commodities. This method appears to be satis--
factory in its application to standardised and non-durable consumer-
products as well as capital goods. The results coincided nicely with
the conclusion of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Since Hong Kong and
South Korea are relatively labor abundant while the Group Countries
relatively capital abundant, we would thus expect Hong Kong and South
Korea to have a comparative advantages in labor intensive products
and the Group Countries in capital intensive products.
It also appears that cost differences play an important role
in determining the export performance of industries manufacturing
non-durable consumer products. Cost differences often find their
origin in the availability and cost of raw materials in the case of
material-intensive products, e.g. Furniture and Footwear for South
Korea, while labor costs appear to be the main factor determining
advantages in regard to Textiles, Clothings, Electric and Miscel¬
laneous goods for both countries.
Non-price factors of course bear an important influence in
determining the magnitude of the comparative advantages and the
quantities of exports to the Group Countries by Hong Kong and South
Korea. This discussion indicates some of the dificiences of the
traditional theories of international trade that attempt to explain
international specialisation, and to indicate the gains from special¬
isation, by the use of a single classifying principle- should this
be inter-country differences in factor endowments or in production
functions. Comparative advantages appear to be the outcome of a
number of factors, some measurable, others not, some easily pinned
down, others less so. One wonders, therefore, whether more could not
be gained if, instead of enunciating general principles and trying
to apply these to explain actual trade flows, one took the observed
pattern of trade as a point of departure, and subsequently attempted
to find the main influences that have determined the pattern.
CHAPTER VII: AN ANALYSIS OF HONG KONG AND SOUTH KOREA TRADE FLOWS
7.1: Aim and Nature of the Analvsis:
Am economic model describing international trade flows can
be formulated in varying degrees of detail. The present, model, gen¬
erally known as the Gravity Model, is a very simple one, having only
that aspect which is relevant to the aim of this study, i.e., the
determination of export trade pattern. It consists of only one equa¬
tion in which the value of total exports from one country to another
is explained by a small number of variables. The explanatory variables
that play a preponderant role are:
(1) the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the exporting country;
(2) the Gross Domestic Product of the importing country.
Other important characteristics of the present analysis are that:
(1) no separate demand and supply functions for exports are int.ro-
duced-meaning that the equation is a turnover relation in
which prices are not specified; and
(2) only a static analysis is made- no attention is paid to the
development of exports over time.
It is obvious that the model could be elaborated considerably
so as to give more attention to other aspects of the trade pattern.
However, for the purpose of this chapter a simplified model will
suffice.
7.2; The flow of trade between two countries:
The main factors that determine the s.i ze of the trade flow
between any pair of countries have been mentioned in 7.1. Their rele¬
vance is as follows:
(1) the amount of exports a country is able to supply depends
on its economic size, i.e. GDP;
(2) the amount that can be sold to a particular country will
vary with the size of that country's market, i.e. the
GDP of the importing country.






total export of Country, to Country.,
i j
GDP of Country and
GDP of Country.. j
The exponents a and a indicate that there is not necessarily12
direct proportionality between the explanatory variables Y_, Y_. and
the dependent variable X_.. Such proportionality would exist only if
the a's are all equal to 1. The factor a is a constant, the numerical
value of which depends on the units in which the variables are mea¬
sured.
The equation implies that exports have a constant elasticity
with respect to each of the two explanatory variables; this means that
a one percent increase in the GDP of Country j always results in an
increase of a percent in the exports of the supplying Country i.
The hypothesis that the two explanatory variables are the most
relevant ones was tested for Hong Kong and South Korea. The export
data were obtained from the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
U.N. while the GDP data were obtained from the Yearbook of National
Accounts Statistics, U.N. Exports values in 1974 were used and the
unknown values of the a's were estimated by least square regression
analysis. The equation in log form is given as
The results of the regression are given below:
The variable Y. is significant at 5% level while the variable
Y. is not significant at all. Also it has the wrong sign. The value
of the coefficient a indicates that changes of Hong Kong or South
Korea exports to a particular country is nearly proportional to the
change of that country's GDP. In 1974, a one percent increase in GDP
of Country j will bring about a 0.92% increase in exports. In order
to see whether this is a general phenomenon, the data for other years,
i.e., 1965-1973, were also tested and the results are presented in
m 1- T O 1
Factors determining the Size of Hong Kong and
South Korea Trade Flows:
log a log Y
















































































The regressions yield the following results. First of all, the
value of a has been declining, with only two minor exceptions, since
1965. It becomes negative in 1974 for the first time. The t-value for
a, which was significant only at 20% level for 1965 and 1966, has been
further declining and become very insignificant in 1974.
As for the variable Y., which represents demand or size of the
market for Hong Kong and South Korea exports, was significant at 10%
level for all years. In fact, the value of the t-statistics has been
almost constant throughout the 10 years period. This means that the
GDP or the economic size of the importing country, reflecting the size
of the market, appears to be important determinant of the trade flows.
However, as for the numerical value of the coefficient itself,
it has been declining from 2.55 in 1965 to about 0.90 in 1974. It means
that, in 1965, a one percent increase in GDP of the importing country
would generate 2.5% increase in exports whereas in 1974,a one percent
increase in GDP of the importing country would generate only 0.9%
increase in export. Thus, the variable, though significant, has become
less and less effective. This could be interpreted as the presence of
competition from indigenous firms and other developing countries, or the
import substitution policies, or the Government policies to restrict
imports. Any one of these is going to hurt Hong Kong and South Korea
exports.
Further, the coefficient a is not significant and it also has
a negative sign throughout the 10 year period. Thus the economic
size of the exporting country seems less important in determining the-
trade flows. We may also interpret the results in the following way.
If the GDP of Hong Kong or South Korea increases, the economy becomes
prosperous, there will be an increase in demand for domestic consum¬
ption. A larger amount of the gross domestic product will be consumed
locally and less will be exported, or increasing prosperity is as¬
sociated with higher employment and higher wages and the competitive
position of the country in the world market is weakened.
Now we would like to test the following equation





export of country i to the four markets as a group,
the GDP of the four markets as a Group, and
1965 .1974.
This time, a time series approach is adopted and the results of
the tests are shown below:
Table 8.2
Factors determining the Size of Hong Kong and
South Korea Exports to the Group
Country
Estimated Value of the Coefficients
Hong Kong -11.123 -0.448 2.560 0.985
(4.213) (0.993) (3.770)
South Korea -14.010 0.872 2.174 0.998
(12.398) (5.129) (7.628)
Both equations give good fit. The coefficient a for Kong Kong
is negative and insignificant, indicating that an increase in Hong
Kong's economic size and strength,reflecting by its GDP, has either
no effect or adverse effect on its exports, or Y as a variable
determining Hong Kong's export is insignificant. The coefficient
a for Hong Kong is positive and significant, implying that an in-
crease in the Group GDP by 1% would increase Hong Kong export to
the Group by 2.6% and the variable is significant at 1% level.
As for South Korea, both a and a2 are significant, indicating
that both supply and demand factor play a role in determining the
level of South Korea export to the Group. An increase of South Korea
GDP by 1% would bring an increase of South Korea export to the Group
by 0.9%. Further, if the GDP of the Group increase by 1% there will
be an increase of South Korea export to the Group by 2.2%
Comparing the two coefficients a in Table 8.2 reveals that
when there is an increase.in Group GDP, it increases the Hong Kong
exports more than South Korea exports by 0.39%. The results of Table
8.2 show the general pattern of Hong Kong and South Korea export to
the Group as a whole and the significance of individual variables.
Nov we would like to test the export of Hong Kong and South Korea
to each of the four markets over the period 1965-1974. A time-series
approach will be used, and the equation is as follows:
e
(3)
where i (Hong Kong, South Korea)
(USA, UK, Germany, Japan), and
t (1965 .1974)
The results of the tests are presented in the following two
tables.
Table 8.3
Factors determining the Size of Hong Kong
Exports
log X..= log a+ a_ log Y.,+ a log Y.
13 o 1 it 2 jt
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Factors determining the Size of South
Korea Exports
log X..= log a+ a_ log Y.+ a„ log Y.
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The results of the four regressions of South Korea exports are
given in Table 8.4. The coefficient a1 and a2 for U.S.A., U.K. and
Germany are all positive, implying that there is a positive relation
between the levels of South Korea exports and the variable Y. and Y.
i j
The two coefficients are also significant at at least 10% level.,
implying that both the demand and supply factor play an important
role in the level of South Korea exports.
The only negative sign belongs to the coefficient a in the
Japan equation. However, the coefficient a is not significant. The
2
R for all the equations are very high, the least being 0.93 for
U.K., giving excellent fit.
As far as Hong Kong exports is concerned, the Group equation
results in Table 8.2 are similar only to Hong Kong export to Germany
equation. As for Hong Kong export to U.S.A., Hong Kong GDP plays
an important role in determining Hong Kong exports to U.S.A., as con-
trast to tjze exports to the Group. As for Hong Kong exports to U.K.
and Japan, the role played by the two variables is just the opposite.
While the demand factor is negative and insignificant for the U.K.
and Japan markets, it is positive and significant for the Group
market. The opposite happens to the supply.
As for South Korea, the Group equation is a true reflection of
South Korea's export performance to the four markets individually.
The variables are all positive except one in all the four markets
and they are significant too. The only exception is the coefficient
a for the Japan market, which is negative and insignificant.
Thus it can be concluded that while the Group equation is con--
sistant with South Korea export performance to each of the four mar¬
kets, it conceals significant variations for the Hong Kong export
performance in each of the four markets. While South Korea's GDP
appears to be a significant determinant of its exports, Hong Kong's
GDP does not indicate consistent effect. In other words, in South
Korea's case,both demand and. supply factors seem to be important
determinants of the level of its exports, and in the case of Hong
Kong, the evidence is less clear cut.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theme of this study deals with the export performances and
structures of Hong Kong and South Korea in the period 1965-1974. Un¬
deniably, study of this kind has been done by many in the past, in¬
cluding those for Hong Kong and South Korea separately. However, we
are not aware of any study which actually compares the export perfor¬
mances and structures of these two Asian countries.
The methodology of this thesis is based on the methods employed
by other comparative studies and convert them into a Hong KongSouth
Korea study. We are comparing 12 sectorssub-sectors instead of all
sectors. This decision was imposed on us by our desire to adapt to
the Hong Kong export picture, i.e. we only compare those industries of
which Kong Kong has a sizable export. Our decision is justified by the
fact that these 12 sectors account for over 70% of the total export
of the two countries.
Further, our study compares the export performance of Hong Kong
and South Korea to four major markets only, first as a Group, then
individually, instead to the world in general. This approach gives us
an opportunity to ascertain whether export performance to the four
markets as a whole is representative of export performance to each
country alone. It also gives us an opportunity to measure the extent
of South Korea challenge in each of the markets.
It is worth pointing out that, in order to make inter-country
comparison meaningful, the two countries should be similar in export
or industrial structure. The findings of Chapter one, which includes
the Commodity and Geographic Concentration Gini-coefficients, and
the waqe hierachv, iustifv our choice.
Chapter 2 outlines the general export pictures of our study in
three levels of aggregation. First, we show the general aggregated
export performance of Hong Kong and South Korea to the whole world.
The trends of the two countries are quite similar in the sense that
both have rising shares from 1965 to 1973. The rates of increase were
different, however. In the Hong Kong case, there was a kink in 1969
whereafter the trend flattened out and eventually fell in 1974. As
for South Korea, the kink occurred in 1971 whereafter the trend
shot up. 1974 was a rather bad year for both countries- their shares
fell for the first time in 10 years.
On a less aggregated level, we depict the export performance of
the two countries in the four markets as a Group. The picture was re¬
markably similar to their performance in the world scene. Hong Kong
had share rises in the Group from 1965 to 1972. There was a kink in
1969 and the subsequent flattening of the curve. The share declined
slightly in 1973 and drastically in 1974. As for South Korea, her
performance in the Group was nearly identical with her world perfor¬
mance. There was the take off in 1971 and the decline in 1574.
At the lowest level of aggregation, we chart out the export
performance of the 12 basic industries of the two countries in the
Group market. In so doing, we found something interesting and which
confirms our earlier suspicion. The year 1969 appears to be the water-
shed for Hong Kong export in all three levels of aggregation. The
worst, of course, was the last one, whereafter 1969 the share of k
these 12 basic industries as a whole actually fell. Although there
was a revival in 1972, but it was only for one year and the share cap-
tured in 1974 was lower than the 1969 peak.
As for South Korea, the period 1971-72 was also the turning point
whereafter the share shot up. Contrart to the Hong Kong basic-industry
performance in the Group market, South Korea maintained its rising
trend in 1974, though with a lower rate of increase.
Up to this point we have been dealing with only overall indus-
trial performance, be it all-industry or basic-industry performance,
we are, however, more interested in the sectoral performance of Hong
Kong and South Korea in the Group market as a whole, and in each of
the four markets under consideration. Not surprisingly, we found that
the overall industrial performance is representative of 9 of the 12
basic industries of Hong Kong. They all have share declines at the
end of the 60's. The three exceptions were Professional, Electric,
and Machinery.
The individual behaviour of the 12 basic industries of South
Korea conforms exactly to their overall industrial performance, i.e.
their shares shot up in the kinked period of 1971-72. The point
that should be emphasised here is the significance of the South Korea
challenge. It is manifested in two ways. First, 5 of the 12 South
Korea industries that have smaller shares than Hong Kong in the Group
market in 1965 have overtaken her Hong Kong counterparts. Together
with Food and Machinery of ::hich South Korea already had an upper
hand at the beginning of the period, South Korea had lead in 7 out
of the 12 industries in 1974. Second, and perhaps more important is
the fact that, in Electric, Clothings and Miscellaneous, the three
largest Hong Kong industries, South Korea is catching up fast.
We then go on to measure the percent gainloss of Hong Kong
and South Korea in the period 1969-74 out of the total gainloss in
the entire period. We also attempted to quantify crudely South Korea
responsibility, by sector, for Hong Kong share decline from the date
of decline in the Group market. Our calculation shows that, of the
10 industries that suffered share decline during the period 1965-74,
South Korea responsibility was greatest in Food, Furniture and Foot¬
wear. Overall, South Korea was 52% responsible for Hong Kong share
decline from 1969 onwards,
It is also our intention to investigate whether the basic-
industry performance in each of the four markets is similar to their
performance in the Group market. This is the main gist of Chapter 3.
We found that the picture differs from one country to another. The
country that gives the best fit is the U.S. market where the basic-
industry of Hong Kong as a whole suffered share loss from 1970 on-
As for South Korea, her basic-industry performance in each of
the four markets is to a very large extent similar to her perfor¬
mance in the Group market- their shares shot up during the 1971-72
In a finer level of aggregation, we tried to analyse each in¬
dividual sector performance in each of the four markets in order to
ascertain whether they conform with the overall basic-industry per¬
formance in the Group market on the one hand, and with the overall
basic-industry performance in a particular market on the other. We
found that 6 of the 12 basic industries in the U.S. market had share
declines in the 1970-74 period. The export performance of these 6
industries coincided with the overall basic-industry performance
in the U.S. market as well as the Group market.
As for South Korea, each of the 12 basic industries scored
share gain throughout the period of 1965-74. This again conforms with
the overall basic-industry performance in the Group market as well
as in each of the four markets.
Since the U.S. market is most important for both countries,
a sector by sector analysis is thus given. Following our previous
procedure, we attempted to quantify the South Korea responsibility
by sector, for Hong Kong share decrine in each of the four markets.
Our computation shows that South Kor©a influence was greatest in the
U.S. and the Japan market.
In Chapter 4, the structure of Hong Kong and South Korea export
was discussed, including certain aspects of changes in structure
over the 1965-74 period. The main analytical tool used was two sim-
le concepts: sector intensity and area intensity of trade. We have
the following findings. First, we observe that South Korea depends
less on its strongest sectors than Hong Kong in the Group market.
This is compatible with the lower Commodity Gini-coefficient in
Table 1.3 and it implies that fall of demand of a particular commod¬
ity will hurt Hong Kong more than South Korea. Taking all the 12
basic industries into consideration, we found that South Korea has
a better sector sector balance in U.K., Germany and Japan. In sum¬
mary, one can say that South Korea shows a definitely more mature
structure than Hong Kong in 1974. The assumption here is that well
balanced trade is a sign of a mature economy.
We also found that the best-sector-balance was not achieved
in the strongest areas. One implication of this finding is that,,
although Hong Kong and South Korea desire a fair share of every
sector in any given market, they are not mature enough to do so.
Further, it also means that they have not penetrated each market
with equal success.
As for area intensities and area balance, we found that Hong
Kong is better area balance than South Korea at the beginning and at
the end of the period in the Group market. This implies that Hong Kong
export outlets are more diversified. This is a healthy sign. Up to
1974, Hong Kong is still better area balance than South Korea in 11
of the 12 sectors. This again coincides with our finding in Table 1.4
that Hong Kong exports as a whole has a lower Geographical Gini-
coefficient than South Korea. We also found that strongest sectors
of the two countries are not best area balanced. It implies that, al¬
though both countries seek trade in all areas, a strong sector does
not guarantee that it will be strong in all areas equally. The re¬
sult also shows that the strong sectors of Hong Kong and South Korea
do not capture its fair share in all areas, hence, a good area
balance. We can thus conclude that Hong Kong has a better area bal¬
ance due to her oversea network while South Korea has a better sector
balance due to her relatively more mature structure.
The major finding of Chapter 2 is the kink that occurs in the
1969-70 period and the subsequent flattening andor falling share of
Hong Kong exports to the world, to the Group and to the U.S. market.
Chapter 5, by using the Constant-Market-Share model, attempts to
decompose the Hong Kong and South Korea export performance into 4
effects, namely, the Growth effect, the Commodity effect, the Area
si.fsct and. the Competitive effects Such decomposition is necessairy
to diagnose factoir that was most responsible for the falling share in the
GrouD market as well as the tt s m a rV o+-
Following the Constant—Market—Share model, we have the following
observations. First, in the Group market, the competitive effect was
-36.7% responsible for Hong Kong share charge and +47% responsible
for South Korea increase in 1969-74 period. The implication of this
is that while South Korea export became more competitive over the
years, Hong Kong became less competitive. Second, comparing the three
periods reveals that, between 1965-69, Hong Kong exports were com¬
petitive, but became very uncompetitive between 1969-74, and moder¬
ately uncompetitive over the whole period of 1965-74. This coincides
nicely with Hong Kong export performance in the Group market, i.e.
during the 1965-69 period, Hong Kong has a share increase, and during
1 Q£.Q— HA T-T ruorr V rx V -cs r rs en in 1 inn
As for a sector-by-sector analysis in the Group market, we
found that 9 of the 12 basic industries have negative competitive
effects in the 1969-74 period. This implies that three quarter of
Hong Kong basic industries have become less competitive in the latter
period. This must be one of the reasons that explains the failing
share in this period. As for South Korea basic industries in the Group
market in the same period, we found that 11 of the 12 industries
scored positive competitive effects. This must also be the reason
that explains the shooting up of the share curve.
Now it seems that it is the loss of competitiveness that was the
cause of Hong Kong share decline in the Group market, what then was
the cause of the loss in competitiveness? Chapter 5, by using the Ri-
cardian Comparative Cost approach, attempts to find the answer.
However, it is rather unfortunate that pre-trade prices are not avail¬
able and various proxies have been used. For example, MacDougall,
Balassa, and Bhagwati have used productivity, wage rate and unit
labor cost as prxies for prices, but their results are not very con-
bib L-CIiU.
We tried ail the three proxies and found that unit labor cost
is the only variable that is significant. Assuming labor is the only
factor of production, unit labor cost as a variable will take care of
productivity and wage rate in determining export prices. Thus, higher
unit labor cost will make export more expensive and an expensive pro-
duct will be less competitive. As we have mentioned in Chapter 1 that
wage rate in Hong Kong is 1.5 times that of South Korea, other things
being equal, higher wage rate would make Hong Kong product less com-
no) i i n fho 1 p -f- o v npri nrl i~hp Qh;= rp Ta70ii 1 ri f p] 1
Undoubtedly, the Ricardian comparative cost approach to the
determination of export has met with various criticisms. One of the
weaknesses of the Ricardian approach is its neglect of non-price
variable which might be crucial in determining export performance.
By adopting the Revealed Comparative Advantage approach, we attempt
to take account, of the non-price variables- and our finding was that
both Hong Kong and South Korea are revealed to have advantaae in
labor intensive products while the Group countries in capital in¬
tensive products. This is in fact in line with the Hechsher-Ohlin
prediction.
In the last chapter we tried to find out whether the demand or
the supply factor is important in determining Hong Kong and South
Korea export to the Group. The result shows that, for both countries'
exports, the demand factor is more important. As for South Korea,
the supply factor also plays some significant role.
This thus ends our discussion on export performance and export
structure of Hong Kong and South Korea. Each chapter follows one
another closely. We first depict the export picture of the two coun¬
tries and found kinks in their export performance. We then decom¬
pose the export performance into four effects and found that it was
mainly the loss in competitiveness that was the cause of the falling
share. The loss of competitiveness appears to be partly due to a high
unit labor cost of exoort commodities in Hona Kona.
The solution to the Hong Kong export problem is thus obvious,
though it may not be simple. First, the wage rate and other costs of
production should not be allowed to rise any further- at least not
faster than her Asian counterparts- in order to make Hong Kong pro-
ducts competitive. Second, as our study shows that Kong Kong does not
have a good sector balance and this should be improved. The solution
to this is diversification. Both Commodity and Geographical diver-
sification are desirable. Lastly, Hong Kong dollar should he be
allowed to appreciate too much that may adversely affect Hong Kong'
competitive position. It is the belief of the author that the above
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